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Legitimate Business Interest: No End in
Sight? An Inquiry into the Status of Privacy
in Cyberspace
Oscar H. Gandy, Jr.t
The fundamental concern about privacy in cyberspace is
about the ways in which the collection, processing, and use of
personal information in the computer-network environment
contribute to a loss of individual power and autonomy. I argue
that the integration of computing power with advanced telecom-
munications networks accelerates the shift in the balance of
power from individuals to the bureaucratic organizations with
which they interact. While the government is usually identified
as the most powerful bureaucratic force because of its warrant to
use the ultimate sanction on individual liberty, this Article
argues that individual corporations, and the corporate sector in
general, exercise considerable, indeed, determinative influence
over the kinds of choices available to individuals as they negoti-
ate an increasingly risky terrain.1
The underlying argument of this Article is quite simple:
businesses have an interest in being informed about individuals
because of the strategic importance of that information to choices
organizations make about their interaction with those individuals
in their different roles as citizen, consumer, and employee.
Businesses have the resources (technical, economic, and legal) to
collect, process, and share this information with increasing effi-
ciency. As a result, there is a growing disparity between what
t Article prepared for The University of Chicago Legal Forum's symposium on "The
Law of Cyberspace." Oscar H. Gandy, Jr. is a professor of communication, the Annenberg
School for Communication, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA. A-A., 1964
Nassau Community College; A.B., 1967 University of New Mexico; M.A., 1970 University
of Pennsylvania; Ph.D., 1976 Stanford University. I acknowledge the assistance of Thomas
Nessinger and Katharina Kopp, and the comments of C. Edwin Baker, Rohan Samarajiva,
Michael Froomkin, Jerry Kang, and David Phillips.
' The influence of uncertainty and risk, including risks which are perceived errone-
ously, is argued to be a defining attribute of the current age. See Ulrich Beck, Risk Soci-
ety: Towards a New Modernity (Mark Ritter trans, Sage, 1992); Anthony Giddens, The
Consequences of Modernity (Stanford University Press, 1990); Kenneth R. Foster, David E.
Bernstein, and Peter W. Huber, eds, Phantom Risk: Scientific Inference and the Law (MIT
Press, 1993).
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individuals know about the organizations whose actions influence
their lives and what these organizations know about them. This
disparity has consequences for the operation of the economy, the
political system, and the evolution of the cultural environment in
which we make sense of our lives.2
The choices individuals make-regarding what they say,
what they do, what kinds of questions they ask, where they go,
and with whom they interact-are governed in part by their
expectations regarding the extent to which knowledge of their
actions may be used to their detriment.3 Concerns about privacy
are not only concerns about ungranted access to personal infor-
mation, but are more fundamentally concerns about the conse-
quences that flow from the loss of control over that information.
Information about an individual's current status and past deci-
sions can be used strategically by others with whom he must in-
teract. Control over access to this kind of personal information is
among the most important rights that the laws of privacy are de-
signed to protect.
Because our use of networked computers may be subject to
surveillance,4 and the resultant data used to facilitate the pro-
duction of strategic intelligence, our search for information and
understanding may ironically limit the options available to us in
other aspects of our lives. Information about our status, choices,
and communication behavior often forms the basis for differentia-
tion, and such difference forms the basis for discrimination.
This is a direct challenge to the assumption that what is good for business is good
for America! This challenge is part of a more general set of challenges to the application
of the Bill of Rights to corporations. In the view of Carl Mayer, "[t]he legal system thus is
creating unaccountable Frankensteins that have superhuman powers but are nonetheless
constitutionally shielded from much actual and potential law enforcement as well as from
accountability to real persons such as workers, consumers, and taxpayers .... The actions
of large modern corporations have a state-like impact on the lives of individuals." Carl J.
Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 Hastings L J
577, 659 (1990).
' This is the fundamental claim made by Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an
Information Society, 135 U Pa L Rev 707, 732-37 (1987). More generally, within the law,
the extent to which an individual's expectation of privacy is considered reasonable and
legitimate describes a circle with a shrinking circumference. See, for example, Priscilla M.
Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy (University of
North Carolina Press, 1995) (especially ch 2).
' I define surveillance to mean the capture of information for the purpose of produc-
ing intelligence or strategically useful knowledge. It may be captured directly or indirect-
ly, in real time or historically. Just as trackers make use of signs like broken twigs,
disturbed leaves, and the characteristics of footprints in order to estimate the number,
weight, and condition of persons being tracked, surveillance of transaction records pro-
vides a similar basis for strategic inference.
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Thus, my concern about the status of privacy in cyberspace is
fundamentally a concern with discrimination.'
The collection of information about an individual's use of
networked information informs and enhances the operation of a
discriminatory technology that depends on the reliable assign-
ment of individuals to groups. All groups are social constructs.
The definition of-a group and the specification of its boundaries is
usually made on the basis of a set of attributes that have been
selected, refined, and valued institutionally. The administrative
use of knowledge regarding such groups contributes to the estab-
lishment and maintenance of a kind of categorical vulnerability
where people assigned to, or identified with, such groups become
the victims of discrimination. This vulnerability represents a
challenge to the egalitarian ideals underlying contemporary and
traditional understandings of both polity and market.'
Although the consequences are paradoxical, evolving legal
standards suggest that as an individual's expectation that he is
under surveillance increases, the scope of his expectation of
privacy decreases. Under a governing interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment (and common law extensions to private
entities), individuals who engage in activities that they know, or
should know, may be subject to surveillance are often treated as
having granted consent for such surveillance.7 Thus, organiza-
tional actors that wish to establish the legitimacy of their inva-
sion of personal space have an incentive to publicize the fact or
likelihood of surveillance.' Privacy activists and scholars also
See, for example, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., It's Discrimination Stupid!, in James Brook
and Ian A. Boal, eds, Resisting the Virtual Life: The Culture and Politics of Information 35
(City Lights Books, 1995).
' See, generally, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Toward a Political Economy of Personal Infor-
mation, 10 Critical Studies in Mass Communication 70, 83-85 (1993).
7 Paul Schwartz, among others, makes this point. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and
Participation: Personal Information and Public Sector Regulation in the United States, 80
Iowa L Rev 553 (1995). Schwartz suggests that "the Supreme Court's search for reason-
able expectations of privacy is tautological.... [T]he Supreme Court accepts as a given
the apparently lowered expectations of privacy resulting from new technology." In one
bizarre example, the Court suggests that hidden audio bugs are to be expected. "According
to the Court, we all know, after all, that anyone we talk with might wear such a device;
thus, there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in such conversations." Id at 573-
74, citing United States v White, 401 US 745, 753 (1971). See also, Laurence A. Benner,
Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rehnquist Court, 22 John Marshall L Rev 825
(1989).
8 At the same time, recognizing the increasing salience of privacy concerns has led
some organizations to differentiate themselves from their competitors in terms of their
privacy stance. A most interesting example is the series of advertisements introduced by
AT&T in 1995 that label the "calling circles" of MCI's "Friends and Families" tariff an
80 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
have an incentive to publicize this threat to privacy. Thus, by
pointing to areas in which private space and associated liberties
are increasingly open to assault, activists seeking to protect
privacy and organizations seeking to differentiate their treatment
of consumer privacy may actually help to crystallize its decline.
Thus, while I may view with some skepticism the claims
made on behalf of an "information superhighway" that is sup-
posed to take us to that wonderful Land of Oz we have named
cyberspace,9 I also realize that by emphasizing the privacy risks
therein, I may contribute to a narrowing of the sphere of reason-
ableness. While it is unlikely that such a decline can actually be
reversed, this Article is written with the hope that legislative in-
tervention and judicial review may at the very least slow down
the rate of contraction. This goal will be pursued in part by
focusing on an aspect of the legislative and judicial construction
of reasonableness that is a critical determinant of privacy's
demise. I refer here to the privileged status given to "legitimate
business interest" as the basis for limiting the exercise of an
individual's right of privacy.
This Article is organized into four sections. Part I explores
the nature of business interests in personal and group informa-
tion. Part II describes the means through which information is
gathered and transformed into strategic intelligence. This section
also includes special reference to the capture and use of transac-
tion-generated information in the network environment. Part III
outlines the traditional basis for informational privacy concerns.
Part IV argues for an expansion of traditional approaches to data
protection in order to address the problem of categorical vulnera-
bility and then recommends a set of principles and policies for
institutionalizing the control of personal information in the
individual and collective interests of citizens, consumers, and
employees.
I. THE NATURE OF BUSINESS INTERESTS
A. The Business Interest in Information
Corporate decisionmakers have an interest in being informed
about all aspects of the environment in which they operate. This
environment includes individuals to the extent that they may, in
affront to privacy.
' Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Information Superhighway as the Yellow Brick Road,
National Forum 24-27 (Spring 1994).
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some identifiable way, affect the corporation's ability to realize
its goals of survival, growth, and increasing profitability. As
corporations' operating environments change, their need for infor-
mation increases, sometimes exponentially. Access to this infor-
mation is necessarily limited by the cost of available resources.
For example, raw data may have to be subjected to expensive and
uncertain processing in order to be transformed into useful infor-
mation. A great many constraints, many of them legal," may
also serve to limit an organization's access to raw data. At the
same time, however, advances in information technology serve to
reduce the cost of transforming raw data into strategic intelli-
gence. Increasingly, these technological advances also succeed in
overcoming some of the obstacles that social, cultural, or legal re-
gimes may have represented in the past.
I am unwilling to grant that all corporate interest in infor-
mation is legitimate, especially if such legitimacy makes the
corporate interest superior to other relevant interests. My will-
ingness to grant the legitimacy" of business interests in individ-
ual information varies as a function of the character of the rela-
tionship between an individual and an organization. My com-
ments will be focused on three fundamental relationships: be-
tween employer and employee, producer and consumer, and cor-
poration and citizen. The differences between these relationships
may be understood in terms of functional proximity, although the
parallels to physical distance and constructs like "arms length"
inadequately capture the multidimensional character of such
relations. A critical aspect of these relations is the degree of pow-
er and influence that each may exercise over the other. 2
While it seems that there will almost always be some struc-
tural aspect of a relationship that favors the organization over
the individual, such asymmetry is more problematic and distaste-
10 Rules regarding intellectual property that limit corporate access to product, pro-
cess, and market defining information are among the more serious constraints.
" Here I mean legitimacy to include both the expectations (which may vary) and
legally specified boundaries on reasonableness, even though I believe they often differ
dramatically when we consider the views of individuals and groups.
12 An influential discussion of the nature of power in the economic realm may be
found in Randall Bartlett, Economics and Power: An Inquiry into Human Relations and
Markets (Cambridge University Press, 1989). Several authors have explored the nature of
consumer expectations regarding the relationship between them and private concerns.
Ellen Foxman and Paula Kilcoyne discuss these expectations in relation to privacy ex-
pectations as engaging ethical considerations. See Ellen R. Foxman and Paula Kilcoyne,
Information Technology, Marketing Practice, and Consumer Privacy: Ethical Issues, 12 J
Public Policy & Marketing 106 (1993).
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ful in some relationships than in others. The relationship be-
tween an individual and an employer, or potential employer, is
substantially different from the relationship between a consumer
(also actual or potential) and a provider of goods and services
because of the options that each party can reasonably pursue.
Moreover, an imbalance that is merely troublesome, disturbing,
or objectionable in the first two cases becomes unacceptable when
the relationship between the individual and the corporation is in
the political realm, or the public sphere, 3 where the assump-
tions of equality are more fundamental.
B. Corporate Interest in Discrimination
The corporate interest in discrimination has raised concerns
about the use of personal information within the context of civil
rights, where the use of racial identification may affect the equal-
ity of economic opportunity. However, the corporate interest in
discriminating between individuals on the basis of other kinds of
personal information has not enjoyed a comparative level of at-
tention. At various times, and in different areas of business activ-
ity, "suspect classes" have been expanded to include gender, age,
religion, and marital status. Restrictions on the use of informa-
tion about membership in these suspect classes apply primarily
to matters of employment, housing, credit, and insurance. Even
though the classification of individuals into groups on the basis of
these attributes may have predictive utility because of a high and
relatively stable correlation or association between group status
and some other criterion, as a society we have come to see their
use as illegitimate. 4
The public sphere is understood as that social space beyond the private in which
conversation and other forms of communicative action can form the basis for the kind of
authentic, rather than manipulated, public opinion that enables democracies to function.
Considerable scholarly debate about the status of the public sphere, and of the democratic
prospect, has been influenced by the work of Jtirgen Habermas, especially, The Structural
Transformation of the Public Sphere (Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence trans, MIT
Press, 1989). The linguistic style of Habermas's theoretical argumentation is precise, but
difficult to represent simply. My effort to examine the relations between the firm and the
individual covers similar ground to Habermas's project to examine the "subsumption of
the lifeworld under system imperatives." Steven K White, The Recent Work of Jiurgen
Habermas: Reason, Justice and Modernity 108 (Cambridge University Press, 1988).
Habermas argues that "to comprehend the true dimensions of the loss of freedom in
advanced capitalism, one must take into account all four roles [employee, consumer,
client, citizen] and their changing relationship." Id.
" Barbara D. Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statis-
tical Inference and Individualized Judgement, 88 Yale L J 1408, 1414-20 (1979).
Underwood identifies several concerns, including perceived legitimacy of the predictive
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Sorting by traits such as race and gender raises objections in
the ethical sphere because the attributes that define the trait are
frequently the product of forces beyond the willful choice of indi-
viduals. Our sense of fairness seems to imply that individuals
should not be made to suffer because of factors that are beyond
their control."5 Sorting by traits raises objections in the econom-
ic sphere because the assumption of causal links between traits
and performance is often unwarranted. Both moral and economic
concerns are raised when those who would sort individuals on
the basis of shared traits assume that the average or central
tendency for a population should be attributed equally to all
members of that population.16
At the same time, critics argue that to restrict the use of
traits is economically inefficient. 7 It is far more costly to gather
information about each individual than to assign an average
score or rating. However, it is also recognized that activities that
may be seen as efficient or productive for particular individuals
(or collectives) may also generate inefficiencies or externalities
that assign costs to still others in ways we hold to be unfair.'"
These external effects often operate as a constraint on the ability
of other economic actors to make rational, efficient choices.
9
Actors that have substantial market power are able to assign
costs to other less powerful participants in those markets."
scheme and respect for the autonomy of the individual, that argue against the use of
predictive technologies.
" The legal doctrine of suspect classifications implies an empirical assessment of
individual and institutional behavior with regard to particular classes that results in
departure from a social norm, such as equal protection before the law. See Ronald R.
Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S Cal L Rev 1001, 1023-25
(1983).
6 See, generally, Lea Brilmayer, Douglas Laycock, and Teresa A. Sullivan, The
Efficient Use of Group Averages as Nondiscrimination: A Rejoinder to Professor Benston,
50 U Chi L Rev 222 (1983); Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131
U Pa L Rev 517 (1983); Kenneth S. Abraham, Distributing Risk: Insurance, Legal Theory,
and Public Policy 64-100 (Yale University Press, 1986).
17 See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31
San Diego L Rev 1 (1994); Underwood, 88 Yale L J at 1408 (cited in note 14). Compare
Leah Wortham, Insurance Classification: Too Important to be Left to the Actuaries, 19 J L
Reform 349 (1986).
"8 Walter Adams and James W. Brock, The Bigness Complex: Industry, Labor and
Government in the American Economy 254-56 (Pantheon Books, 1986); Bailey Kuklin, The
Gaps Between the Fingers of the Invisible Hand, 58 Brooklyn L Rev 835, 857-60 (1992).
19 Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII's Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and
Realities, 46 Alabama L Rev 375 (1995); Robert Cooter, Market Affirmative Action, 31 San
Diego L Rev 133, 160-66 (1994).
o An obviously extreme example is the now generally despised tradition of slavery.
Clearly the institution can be seen as efficient and rewarding for slaveholders, although
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A concern with productivity or efficiency that recognizes the
long-term consequences of power asymmetries leads necessarily
toward a consideration of the distributive aspects of a socioeco-
nomic system such as capitalism. When the presence of external
effects or other departures from the competitive ideal is recog-
nized, serious questions about the rational basis upon which to
frame policy recommendations arise. These questions are most
salient in the context of discussions about discrimination.
In a social system governed by perfectly competitive markets,
irrational discriminatory preferences would be punished, perhaps
to extinction. Of course, in the ideal world of a perfect market,
there is also perfect information, or else information that is ei-
ther costless or easily redistributed. We do not, however, enjoy
such a world. Corporate decisions continue to proceed on the
basis of traits that assign costs to individuals in ways that may
contribute perversely to a weakening of the normative basis of
society.2
Although networked computers will increase the variety of
means by which corporate actors may learn more about the indi-
viduals with whom they interact, these systems will never elimi-
nate irrational trait discrimination. Individuals are almost al-
ways compared with some group standard. Those standards are
traits (such as honesty, ambition, mathematical maturity, verbal
acuity, etc.), and they are necessarily flawed as representations
of the qualities of any particular individual. Trait-based decisions
will thus always be in error because no single individual will
ever share the exact same attributes of the ideal, aggregate, or
"average person" that is reflected in cultural stereotypes, or in
sophisticated mathematical models. Indeed, since many of the
the costs of maintaining a submissive labor force were bound to rise over time. In addi-
tion, forms of exploitation that include discrimination in labor markets on the basis of
race, gender, national origin, and immigrant status continue to reward the powerful. The
general failure of mainstream economic theory to take due note of the influence of this
sort of asymmetry is discussed in Walter Adams and James W. Brock, Economic Theory:
Rhetoric, Reality, Rationalization, in Robert E. Babe, ed, Information and Communication
In Economics 125-135 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994).
21 It has been suggested by several sources that members of minority groups may
underinvest in education or other self-improvement strategies because they interpret
evidence of continuing racial discrimination as an index of the true returns on such in-
vestments. That same discrimination weakens their trust of public institutions and their
commitment to the moral and ethical principals that legal equality assumes. See, for
example, Derrick Bell, Faces at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanence of Racism (Basic
Books, 1992). Distributional consequences not specifically related to race, but more gener-
ally to the poor are discussed in C. Edwin Baker, Posner's Privacy Mystery and the Failure
of Economic Analysis of Law, 12 Ga L Rev 475, 477-79 (1978).
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differences between people exist only in the context of theoretical
models with idiosyncratically defined variables, the number of
potentially relevant traits is unlimited, and each of them will be
marked by various degrees of measurement and specification
error. In the context of predictive models that make use of nu-
merous variables claimed to indicate particular qualities or traits
of individuals, the fact that these estimates are based on unreli-
ably measured theoretical constructs should lead us to expect
these errors to multiply.2 Despite the presence of error in such
models, this kind of trait-based discrimination seems likely to
continue for two important reasons. First, the costs of gathering
more reliable information about productivity are often quite high,
perhaps infinite, when the information needed relates to future
productivity in tasks that are as yet barely imagined. Second, the
identifiable costs of choosing on the basis of traits are not so high
for market actors with sufficient power such that survival, or
even prosperity, is seriously threatened. This is especially true,
for example, when unemployment is high, and an employer can
afford to reject large numbers of applicants. It seems likely that a
great many that are rejected could perform as well or better than
those that are hired, but it is primarily the worker, rather than
the employer, that bears the cost of rejection.
C. Areas of Corporate Interest: Employees
A corporation has an interest in knowing about individuals
in their roles as potential, and current, employees. This interest
is linked to a rational desire to make informed selections on the
basis of expectations about productivity and about a variety of
associated costs, especially as they might be related to health,
disability, and other work-related expenses. Richard Posner has
argued that "tihere is no economic reason to suppose that em-
ployers would demand from employees and job applicants more
information than was cost-justified in terms of its benefits to the
employer in screening out unsuitable employees."23 Unfortunate-
ly, there is no way for the employer to know conclusively how
22 Computer scientists provide us with GIGO, an acronym for "garbage in; garbage
out," as a warning against reliance on computer models that depend upon data of ques-
tionable reliability. Similar criticism of multivariate models is raised within the discourse
on econometrics and in the evaluation of causal models. See, for example, Robert McPhee
and Austin Babrow, Causal Modeling in Communication Research: Use, Disuse, and Mis-
use, 54 Communication Monographs 344, 350-52 (Dec 1987).
Richard A. Posner, The 1978 James McCormick Mitchell Lecture: Privacy, Secrecy,
and Reputation, 28 Buff L Rev 1, 43 (1979).
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much information is needed to make the initial and subsequent
decisions that will have to be made regarding any employee.
Employers are uncertain about the "quality" of the information,
the utility of the information for prediction, and, more
problematically, the aspects of this relationship that will evolve
in the future that might be reliably predicted on the basis of
information gathered in the present. Thus, there is always a
pressure to gather more and more information, and the demand
for personal information must increase as the costs of gathering,
storing, and processing it decline.
This interest in "knowing the employee" is pursued by an
expanding array of techniques for gathering information as raw
material to be used in attempting to predict individual behavior.
For the corporation, an acceptable level of predictability is
achieved in part through a process that assigns individuals to a
group sharing "relevant" traits, and where accumulated data on
the group as a whole may provide an empirical basis for estimat-
ing an actuarial probability.24
It is important to understand that the assignment of individ-
uals to groups, which may entail assigning them a score repre-
senting the mean of the distribution of scores for the group to
which they have been assigned, is only part of the process of
classification or characterization. An auxiliary market has de-
veloped to assist corporations in assigning applicants to groups.
The numbers of applicants that major corporations must process
during the average week supports the development of several
competing software packages that allow personal computers to
process resumes and application forms automatically.25
The job seeker provides an extensive amount of personal
information as a condition of being considered for the job. Infor-
mation provided directly on the application represents only a
fraction of the information that employers believe they need, and
frequently require, from applicants. In addition, applicants often
must submit themselves to physical examination by health-care
professionals--examinations that increasingly may involve as-
24 It is important to note here, and at each occasion in which I refer to group char-
acteristics, that the entire population is never measured. Estimates are made on the basis
of samples-samples of persons and samples of status that differ markedly in terms of the
conditions under which measurements are taken.
25 Resumix Introduces First Expert System-Based Tool that Allows Companies to
Manage People, Business Wire (Nov 1, 1993). See also, Glenn Rifkin, Virtual Recruiter:
Software that Reads Resumes, NY Times § 3'at 12 (Mar 24, 1996).
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sessments of blood, urine, and genetic material. Frequently, they
must authorize the release of medical records.
Depending upon the nature of the job, prescreening may
involve a battery of psychological tests that utilize physiological
measures, such as those that are believed to indicate dishonesty
or other aspects of an individual's personality. Much has been
written about the reliability of these indicators of productivity.26
Some of the measures operationalize cultural or ideological as-
sumptions that are widely shared, even though they have not
been empirically validated.
The problems in discriminating among individuals for the
purpose of making employment, assignment, and compensation
decisions are legion,2 7 and in an increasingly litigious environ-
ment, the pressure to collect more and more information can only
increase.2' The rapidly rising costs of providing medical benefits
have increased employers' determination to gather information
about employee behavior off the job, and worker opposition has
not been sufficient to deny them access.29It should be clear that
I am not arguing that the search for information about actual
and potential employees is an indication of irrational behavior on
the part of businesses. Even though I have suggested that the
tools and strategies used in screening and assessment are
fraught with error, there is a rational basis for their use. Indeed,
in some quarters the fact that these methods are in widespread
use might serve as evidence that their use is "efficient." ° What
I am suggesting, however, is that the choices that are likely to be
made are not the only choices possible from among equally effi-
cient options. In addition, if those choices were made on the basis
of some trait that replicates and reinforces a bias that produces
or reproduces a systematic cultural bias in the distribution of life
26 See Susan Gardner, Wiretapping the Mind: A Call to Regulate Truth Verification in
Employment, 21 San Diego L Rev 295 (1984); Note, Protecting Employees and Neglecting
Technology Assessment: The Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, 55 Brooklyn L
Rev 1315 (1990); Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discrimination in "General Ability" Job
Testing, 104 Harv L Rev 1157 (1991).
27 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Information and Organizations 240-73 (Berkeley: Universi-
ty of California Press, 1990).
28 Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 177-79
(Basic Books, 1988).
' An analysis of public opinion regarding off-the-job activities indicates a rather
broad expectation of privacy in those activities. Whose Business Is It Anyway? A National
Opinion Survey on Workplace Decisions and Employee Privacy v-viii (National Consumers
League, Jan 1990).
"' Adams & Brock, The Bigness Complex at 81-82 (cited in note 18) suggest that
much of the discourse on efficiency is tautological.
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chances, then this is a form of discrimination that deserves atten-
tion, even if it is not presently against the law.31
D. Owning the Consumer
The corporate interest in actual and potential consumers is
centered in a rational desire to maximize the future streams of
revenue from sales while minimizing the future sum of expenses
related to producing those sales. Gathering information about the
tastes, preferences, and responsiveness of consumers to monetary
and other incentives is believed to be critical to the realization of
these goals.32 Marketing specialists believe that learning more
about consumers is necessary in order to increase the ability of
the firm to control the relationship, to literally "own the custom-
er.
, 33
While some may prefer to think that the relationship be-
tween stores and their customers is akin to that which obtains
between master and servant, I think a more accurate metaphor
is one which describes the relationship between an angler and a
trout. The most successful anglers are those who know the
tastes, preferences, and habits of particular species and the envi-
ronments in which they dwell. They also know just how to pres-
ent the fly and how to set the hook to ensure that the prey can-
not escape. The greater the angler's store of knowledge, the more
likely is her creel to be filled with the largest fish in the brook.
This knowledge, often jealously guarded, clearly serves the an-
gler, not the trout, even though, I must confess, no trout of my
acquaintance has ever been "forced" to bite.34
31 Kelman, 104 Harv L Rev at 1183-97 (cited in note 26). After an extensive review of
economic and moral concerns related to job testing and its many consequences, especially
those affecting African Americans, Kelman argues against the use of any method which
might be marginally predictive if it would "disproportionately exclude capable blacks." Id
at 1245. I wish to raise the lens higher still to speak against the use of discriminatory
sorts that disproportionately exclude any identifiable capable "others." See Oscar H.
Gandy, Jr., It's Discrimination Stupid!, in James Brook and Ian A. Boal, eds, Resisting the
Virtual Life: The Culture and Politics of Information 35 (City Lights Books, 1995)(cited in
note 5).
32 Of course, success in business is much more complicated as it involves not only the
actions of a particular entity, but the actions of competitors as well.
' Jim Bessen, Riding the Marketing Information Wave, Harv Bus Rev 150, 153 (Sept-
Oct 1993). See also Itamar Simonson, Get Closer to Your Customers by Understanding
How They Make Choices, 35 Cal Management Rev 68 (1993).
. Of course, the marketing literature does not use this metaphor-it is far too
peaceful. Instead, an unabashedly military discourse about targets, maps, and strategies
is widespread. See John Goss, "We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You Live"
The Instrumental Rationality of Geodemographic Systems, 71 Econ Geography 171 (1995).
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While the language of "customer service" can certainly be
found, there are also numerous examples within the marketing
literature that suggest that marketing resources are directed
more toward manipulation than informing rational consumer
choice. One reviewer of the contemporary "framing" literature
concludes that "the findings of these studies suggest that
consumers' purchase decisions can be influenced by a variety of
seemingly irrelevant manipulations of the manner in which op-
tions are evaluated."35 And while this particular scholar forth-
rightly discusses the moral and ethical dilemmas involved in
using this information, I have little reason to expect that oppor-
tunistic behavior of this sort will be controlled substantially by
self-discipline and moral reasoning.36 Instead, the pressures will
only increase on product and brand managers to learn even more
about consumers, including the most efficient and effective way
to capture their attention and secure their agreement to buy.
Decisions about where to focus marketing resources, includ-
ing the placement of advertising and promotion, are usually
based upon information about classes or categories of consumers.
As with employment decisions, personal information is required
both to assign identifiable individuals to existing categories, as
well as to enhance the reliability of statistical techniques that
characterize individuals and predict their behavior.
Some of the more active users of personal information for
marketing purposes are those who communicate directly with
individuals. These "direct marketers" are among the most active
users of commercially available information about individuals
that supports the "profiling" of consumers.37 Profiles are used by
direct marketers to estimate the probability of an affirmative
response by consumers they have assigned to different categories
or groups.
A variety of statistical techniques are used to predict the
response of individuals to different kinds of promotional offers.
' Simonson, 35 Cal Management Rev at 74 (cited in note 33). Simonson discusses the
insights to be derived from consumer decision theory and the kinds of success that mar-
kets might enjoy through strategic "choice set manipulations." This work underscores the
insights derived from an extensive body of research performed by Amos Tversky and
Daniel Kahneman that demonstrates that the "framing" of alternatives helps to shift
preferences between objectively equivalent options. See Amos Tversky and Daniel
Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J Business S251 (1986).
See Foxman & Kilcoyne, 12 Public Policy & Marketing at 114 (cited in note 12).
'7 Joel Reidenberg discusses direct marketing and profiling in the context of related
information practices. Joel R. Reidenberg, Setting Standards for Fair Information Practice
in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 Iowa L Rev 497, 516-23 (1995).
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Various scoring methods produce a single score that indicates the
probability of an affirmative response. "Prospects" can be ranked
on the basis of that probability. At some point in the distribution
of scores a "cut-off' will be established, and prospects below that
point will not be provided an opportunity to respond. For applica-
tions, a similar distribution can be used to determine which
groups receive which discounts or premiums and those which will
receive no offers at all. In one example described in a banking
journal, an organization established a "hard exclusion," which
meant that customers whose rating fell below a particular score
would not receive the promotion under any condition. This exclu-
sion actually eliminated half of the portfolio!38 From the per-
spective of the firm, reducing communications with individuals
unlikely to respond often means a sizeable savings. In another
example from the same article, a firm's initial investment costs
for developing the prospect model were reportedly recouped
through a reduction in the size of its mailing by 10 percent. 9
While the use of predictive models can obviously represent
substantial savings for individual firms, this discriminatory tech-
nology also has negative consequences for segments of the popu-
lation. These consequences are aspects that I refer to as categori-
cal vulnerability. Some observers have characterized the
exclusionary aspects of predictive models as "socially negative"
because
[c]ertain groups can be substantially underrepresented
in targeted campaigns, in effect widening the gulf be-
tween lower- and upper-income groups.... Campaigns
based on past purchasing patterns and tied to future
discounts can become a self-fulfilling prophecy, target-
ing upscale consumers with economic incentives while
excluding poorer clusters from increasingly important
sources of product information and exchange.4"
The use of data derived from interactions with consumers
has come to be known as database marketing. According to
Thomas McManus,
38 Christopher Frothinger, Results Oriented Direct Marketing, 25 Bank Marketing 24,
26 (June 1993).
' Id.
4o Frank V. Cespedes and H. Jeff Smith, Database Marketing: New Rules for Policy
and Practice, 34 Sloan Management Rev 7, 13 (1993).
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[d]atabase marketing is the notion that the computer is
a revolutionary tool for identifying, locating, and char-
acterizing customers. It is the belief that if you under-
stand the characteristics of a customer, you can find
other people with similar characteristics and make
them customers, too. Most of all, it involves a synthesis
of internal customer information with externally avail-
able information as part of a system for communicating
with and obtaining feedback from the market.41
Database marketing has become something of a fad within
the marketing profession. Although there are numerous reports
of the success that individual firms have had in capturing market
share, the empirical basis for confidence in the technique has not
been firmly established. It may be the case that expectations
have outrun the evidence, a circumstance that Arthur
Stinchcombe suggests is quite common: "fashions in rational
technique can spread faster than their value justifies, and value
choices can be concealed in the choice of technique not under-
stood by the people or organizations whose utilities are supposed-
ly being maximized by rational means."42 This uncertainty, how-
ever, has not limited the extent to which corporations have used
these techniques to modify their strategic marketing plans, at the
same time that they have begun to use them in their relations
with individuals as citizens.'
E. The Corporation and the Citizen
Although this section refers primarily to relations between
corporations and citizens who may have no other relationship
with the firm, it should be emphasized that corporations have a
genuine interest, and make substantial investments, in determin-
41 Thomas E. McManus, Telephone Transaction-Generated Information: Rights and
Restrictions 30 (Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy, 1990).
42 Arthur L. Stinchcombe, Reason and Rationality, in Karen Schweers Cook and
Margaret Levi, eds, The Limits of Rationality 285, 310 (University of Chicago Press,
1990).
" A recent assessment of this trend is clear on this point: "Politics and campaigns
are structured around how, where, and to whom a candidate or issue should be presented.
In developing such strategies and tactics, campaign managers and political consultants do
not turn to texts on American government or treatises on democratic theories. Instead,
they consult experts in product development and advertising. Marketing has become the
area of expertise in modern political campaigns." Mary J. Culnan and Patricia M: Regan,
Privacy Issues and the Creation of Campaign Mailing Lists, 11 Information Society 85, 86-
87 (1995).
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ing the best ways to approach and influence their own employees
in their roles as citizens. This is the realm of internal public
relations in which firms seek to: (a) determine which public poli-
cies employees favor, (b) identify which employees are likely to
want information about public-policy changes that could effect
their company, (c) ascertain which information can help them
decide whether to support the company stance on public policy,
(d) locate the employees who are willing to communicate on be-
half of the company, and (e) give them the information they want
to be responsible corporate spokespersons in letters and phone
calls to legislators and regulators."
The potential for using information gathered in pre-employ-
ment interviews and background checks, as well as from the
various forms of employee monitoring, to guide corporate deci-
sions about involving employees in political action is quite high
and is itself worthy of a lengthy discussion. However, corpora-
tions also have an interest in knowing as much as possible about
other presumably unrelated citizens in order to improve the effi-
ciency with which they can influence their political behavior. As I
will discuss, one way to influence public policy is to mobilize pub-
lic opinion through the mass media-through the exercise of
speech rights that corporations have won over time. Another, and
perhaps more insidious way, is through private communications
targeted to individual citizens.
The corporation need not have any direct relationship with
an individual citizen to be interested in influencing her political
activity, since any individual might, by her action, influence the
environment in which the corporation does business.45 Of the
many ways by which corporations may attempt to influence the
impact of government action, corporate-sponsored grass-roots
lobbying represents a particularly troublesome distortion of the
democratic participatory ideal."6
" Robert Heath, William Douglas, and Michael Russell, Constituency Building: Deter-
mining employee's willingness to participate in corporate political activities, 7(4) Journal of
Public Relations Research 273, 274 (1995).
' Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dimension (The Free Press, 1988) (especially chs 12-13).
• William L. Renfro describes a dramatic shift in the locus of political influence. The
political sphere is described as being incapable of arriving at decisions while the private
sector has moved increasingly to act in its own interest and make decisions which have
the effect of public policy. He discusses this shift in terms of a new social contract: "This
de facto shift in power from the political arena to the private sector-changing the eco-
nomic contract to a social one and.creating a de facto private sector constitution-is the
most important political and management development of the last century.' William L.
Renfro, Issues Management in Strategic Planning 30 (Quorum Books, 1993). See also,
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1. Grass-roots lobbying.
Through a variety of means, including the creation of "front
organizations" with names that are designed to imply that the
founders of the group are individual concerned citizens, 7 corpo-
rations make use of their substantial financial resources to mobi-
lize public opinion in ways that have dramatically shifted the
outcome of numerous elections and referenda. 8 Corporate inter-
ests in policy debates are pursued actively through specialized
industry associations that have professional staff responsible for
mobilizing segments of the electorate as circumstances dictate.49
Here it is important to note that not all corporate actions in the
policy arena can be identified as clear wins. However, a mere
delay in government action may substantially benefit business interests.'
Frank J. Sorauf, Political Action Committees in American Politics: An Overview, in Twen-
tieth Century Fund Task Force on Political Action Committees, What Price PACS? 87-97
(1984). One author who is less troubled by corporate involvement in the public sphere is
Donald Wittman, who believes that the majority rules governing political decisions reduce
the consequences of the few who might be persuaded by corporate speech. Donald A
Wittman, The Myth of Democratic Failure: Why Political Institutions are Efficient 174-177
(University of Chicago Press, 1995).
" During the health-policy campaign, numerous groups with names like Empower
America, The Health Care Reform Project, and Citizens for a Sound Economy avoided
identifying the organizations that were the actual sponsors of the advertisements. See
Annenberg Public Policy Center, University of Pennsylvania, Media in the Middle: Fair-
ness and Accuracy in the 1994 Health Care Reform Debate (Feb 1995). See also Public-
Interest Pretenders, Consumer Rep 316 (May 1994), which notes that, "[tloday, 'councils,'
'coalitions,' 'alliances,' and groups with 'citizens' and 'consumers' in their names could as
likely be fronts for corporations and trade associations as representatives of 'citizens' or
'consumers.'" Grass-roots lobbying includes the "planned and orchestrated demonstration
of public support" that includes letters and calls to legislators. See Ron Faucheux, The
grassroots explosion, Campaigns & Elections (Dec 1994/Jan 1995).
' Kevin L. Kramer and Edward J. Schneider describe the successful implementation
of targeting strategies to influence local referenda. In one case where funds were sought
by a local Zoo-Museum coalition, the strategy included increased communication with
segments of the population believed likely to support the initiative, and at the same time
"[a] related objective was to keep the salience of the Cultural Institutions Referenda as
low as possible in precincts where opposition was ascertained to be the highest. A strategy
of 'out of sight, out of mind' was followed." Kevin L. Kramer and Edward J. Schneider,
Innovations in Campaign Research: Finding the Voters in the 1980s, in Robert G. Meadow,
ed, New Communication Technologies in Politics 17, 29 (The Washington Program of the
Annenberg School of Communications, 1985).
"9 A well-informed discussion of the techniques of issue management, including grass-
roots lobbying, are described in Meadow, ed, New Communication Technologies in Politics
(cited in note 48). See, especially, the article by Matt Reese, a political consultant who tradi-
tionally supports positions favored by Democrats. Matt. Reese, From Telephone to
Telelobby: Two Decades of Targeted Communications, in Meadow, ed, New Communica-
tions Technologies in Politics at 97-108 (cited in note 48). See also an update compiled by
Joel L. Swerdlow, ed, Media Technology and the Vote: A Source Book (Westview Press,
1988).
50 Jeff and Marie Blyskal have provided numerous examples of such corporate actions
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The recent debate over the Clinton Administration's health-
care initiative saw a great many of these associations move into
action in an effort to manage the debate. While these associations
are in themselves quite large and represent a potent political
force that a politician ignores only at great personal risk, they do
not limit their outreach efforts to their membership, but reach
out to any segment of the general population that can be identi-
fied as sharing a common interest with the association. For ex-
ample, forty-nine groups pledged more than $50 million to pro-
duce and place issue ads to influence the debate over health
care."1 Other estimates put the total expenditure on the health-
care debate in the neighborhood of $100 million, with 60 percent
of these funds being devoted to advertising.52 This health-care
debate is estimated to have accounted for at least two-thirds of
the $320 million increase in expenditures for grass-roots lobbying
between 1991-92 and 1993-94."s
Considerable resources are devoted to mass-communication
channels for the presentation of slickly produced issue advertise-
ments.54 For example, $15 million was reportedly allocated for
the production and use of the "Harry and Louise" spots by the
Health Insurance Industry of America ("HIIA"). This series of
advertisements showing a young middle class couple in a variety
of settings discussing aspects of the health care debate generated
an extensive amount of coverage in the press.55 A very impor-
in their book, PR: How the Public Relations Industry Writes the News (William Morrow &
Co., 1985). James Measell discusses one of these examples, an aerosol spray trade associa-
tion, and argues that it was created "for the specific purpose of delaying government
regulation of the industry." James S. Measell, Trade Associations: Whose Voice? Whose
Vice?, in Elizabeth L. Toth and Robert L. Heath, eds, Rhetorical and Critical Approaches
to Public Relations 225, 235 (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1992). This delay allowed the
industry sufficient time to develop an alternative propellant. In the view of these critics,
"[t]he rhetoric of the public relations campaigns generated by the trade associations was
designed primarily to impede or stall public opinion favorable to legislation, not to provide
information relevant to the scientific debate over aerosols." Id at 235-36.
61 Annenberg Public Policy Center, Media in the Middle at 8 (cited in note 47).
52 Darrell M. West and Diane J. Heith, Harry and Louise Go To Washington: Political
Advertising and Health Care Reform 6 (American Political Science Association, Sept 1994)
(conference paper) (citing estimates made by the Center for Public Integrity). They esti-
mate that the largest spenders were the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers
Association and the Health Insurance Association of America. Id.
Faucheux, Campaigns & Elections (cited in note 47).
It should be noted that information about the composition of audiences for partic-
ular programs is of considerable utility as guidance about where to place particular kinds
of ads. Data about the composition of the audience, in combination with research about
the attitudes, opinions, and responsiveness of audience segments to particular kinds of po-
litical appeals, enables a considerable amount of targeting even within what we generally
think of as mass media.
' Faucheux, Campaigns & Elections (cited in note 47). It should be noted, however,
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tant part of these campaigns involves targeting communications
directly to individuals if possible, or to groups and communities if
there is sufficient information available to make the differences
between communities meaningful.56 Direct mail, delivered by
hand or electronically over the Internet, has become an impor-
tant resource for the management of political issues because of
the personal information that is used to develop the classifica-
tions that guide the segmentation and targeting of grass-roots
populations. Segmentation strategies frequently involve identify-
ing those citizens most likely to vote. By ignoring unlikely voters,
these campaigns may contribute to the further discouragement
and disengagement of these marginal participants.57
It is difficult to estimate the amount of corporate resources
devoted to grass-roots lobbying. This is due in part to the fact
that there are no disclosure requirements that apply to this form
of political action." Indeed, many corporate contributors to
these campaigns incorporate strict confidentiality agreements in
-their contracts with professional grass-roots lobbying firms."
Some observers suggest that politicians are fully aware that
corporate-sponsored grass-roots groups do not represent authen-
that these ads were "targeted" in terms of the limited number of cities in which they were
placed. And perhaps more importantly, they were targeted toward a particular segment of
the population by virtue of the "fact that Harry and Louise were portrayed in the ads as a
yuppie professional couple." West & Heith, Harry and Louise Go To Washington at 13
(cited in note 52). See also, Thomas Scarlett, Killing Health Care Reform. How Clinton's
Opponents Used a Political Media Campaign to Lobby Congress and Sway Public Opinion,
Campaigns & Elections (Oct 1994) (referring to the case study section).
' The techniques of geodemographic clustering, developed to a high art by Jonathan
Robbins and his Claritas Corporation, provide for the multidimensional classification of
neighborhoods defined by zip code and census tract boundaries. Michael J. Weiss, The
Clustering of America 10-14 (Harper & Row, 1988). The application of these classifications
to political ends is described well by Weiss. Id at 21-25. The importance of geographic
regions as the basis for assessments of aggregate and then individual orientation is
discussed in substantial detail by Goss, 71 Economic Geography 171 (cited in note 34).
17 Segmentation of the electorate is also seen as a fundamental problem for democra-
cy in that great differentiation among citizens makes the maintenance of a civil society or
a body politic quite difficult. This difficulty emerges in part because the "profiling or ste-
reotyping of voters involves a fragmentation of the individual and the deindividualization
of political views. The individual is not treated as a 'whole person' but as components that
can be packaged and related in certain ways to gain a desired effect." Culnan & Regan, 11
Information Society at 96 (cited in note 43).
Phil Kuntz, Attempt to Toughen Lobbyist Disclosure Law Leaves Huge Loophole for
'Grass-Roots' Money, Wall Street J A18 (Sept 6, 1995). While organizations whose princi-
ple activity is lobbying must file campaign disclosures identifying their major funders,
there is no requirement that sources be linked with particular messages. See Public-
Interest Pretenders, Consumer Rep at 320 (cited in note 47).
" Kuntz, Wall Street J at A18 (cited in note 58).
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tic public opinion, but they still use the groups' statements to jus-
tify their actions on particular legislation.s
To the extent that grass-roots lobbying mobilizes authentic
supporters of a particular position (unlike "astroturf," where
deception or other strategies are used to recruit the uninformed
and uncommitted to pressure elected officials), political strate-
gists still need to identify those individuals who have a relatively
high potential for recruitment. Strategists need personal informa-
tion to facilitate recruiting in a cost-effective manner. A competi-
tive industry exists to supply voter files and specialized mailing
lists. One organization claims that it "maintains a database of
every registered voter in the United States. Voter records are
enhanced with telephone number, post office address correction,
census geography, ethnic surname identification and if the voter
has contributed to a political campaign or party."61 Segmenta-
tion and targeting of policy-related advertisements is improved
on the basis of information about different "categories" of individ-
ual citizens and the probability that they will be in one audience
rather than another. Audience assessment at a less precise level
determines which broadcast markets will be ignored in the
scheduling of issue advertisements.
2. Corporate speech.
The production of targeted communications that are designed
to influence the outcome of elections and referenda is only part of
the reason we should be concerned about an increase in the pres-
ence of corporate sources in the information environment. Public
relations and other forms of corporate propaganda help to deter-
mine the ways in which we understand the day-to-day realities
that from time to time rise to the level of a public issue. Strategic
communications may actually help to keep many social and eco-
nomic problems from rising to the level of an issue that attracts
the attention of a political entrepreneur and from evolving into
social policies that limit the ways in which corporations pursue
their primary interests.62 The reach of such communications
seems likely to expand dramatically with the development of a
corporate presence on the Internet.
Public-Interest Pretenders, Consumer Rep at 318 (cited in note 47).
' See advertisement by Aristotle Industries, Campaigns and Elections 83 (Feb 1995).
William Renfro describes the issues life cycle of public issues that affect business
interests in his book. Renfro, Issues Management in Strategic Planning (cited in note 46).
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In 1978, with the Supreme Court's ruling in First National
Bank of Boston v Bellotti,63 corporate speech was set free to
reach well beyond those areas that formerly had to be justified in
terms of identifiable business interest."4 In some circumstances,
the Court has recognized the potential for corporate wealth to
"corrupt" the political process.65 For example, in Austin v Michi-
gan State Chamber of Commerce, the Court agreed that routing
corporate funds through segregated funds or political action com-
mittees ("PACs") was a reasonable form of restriction that still
enabled a corporate form of political expression.6" However, the
restrictions it allows have only the appearance, rather than the
reality, of constraint.
The application of the evolving "marketplace of ideas" theory
of the First Amendment as a justification for corporate political
speech raises a number of critical issues. First, while citizens
have a fundamental interest in robust debate, those interests are
not likely to be served if robustness actually comes to mean con-
fusion. Furthermore, critical perspectives on the practice of public
relations as a form of corporate political speech suggest that
"despite the straight-faced attempts of a few public-relations
practitioners to deny it, these methods embrace massive attempts
at obfuscation, misrepresentation, and deceit."67 In such cases
where distorted speech is problematic, more distorted speech is
not the solution, even though more of such speech is likely be-
cause of the extensive resources available to corporate sources.
Second, failures in the market for speech occur for some of the
same reasons that failures occur in the market for goods and
services-the existence of substantial market power. Some have
argued that there is a fundamental power asymmetry between
individuals and the combined power of corporations expressed
through sectoral associations."
435 US 765 (1978).
Id at 784-86. The Court argued that even though the particular issue was a refer-
endum regarding a graduated income tax, there was a societal interest in public debate.
Id at 776. This construction of the issue, as one where the public interest in debate was
superior to any concerns about illegitimate corporate power, is significant in terms of the
way in which corporate interest can be equated with the public interest against the
interests of individuals that might have realized a direct benefit from a progressive
income tax policy. Indeed, the fact of unequal corporate power, if provable, but not as-
sumed, was subordinated to the higher interest in "unfettered debate." Id at 789.
Austin v Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 US 652, 658-60 (1990).
Id at 668-69.
6' Charles E. Lindblom, Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempt to Understand
and Shape Society 106 (Yale University Press, 1990). See also various authors in Toth &
Heath, eds, Rhetorical and Critical Approaches to Public Relations (cited in note 50).
' Charles Lindblom, for example, argues that "the advantages in communication and
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Robert Posch, an articulate and vocal supporter of commer-
cial interests, 9 argues that the direct marketing industry's suc-
cess in the "battle against the privacy agenda" results from the
industry's decision to frame the debate in First Amendment
terms, invoking the corporation's right to communicate with con-
sumers.7 ° The underlying logic of Posch's argument is that be-
cause consumer lists are a resource that direct marketers utilize,
and perhaps even need, to reach their intended audience, any
limitations on their use restricts the corporation's ability to en-
gage in commercial speech.
Not only does Posch argue that consumer lists are protected
by the First Amendment, he also suggests that these lists are
technologies essential to commercial speech:
the content of the message is impossible to create with-
out a thorough understanding of the targeted customer.
This is built into your database. Restrictions on the
creation of your database constitute a prior restraint on
the content of your message and a general restraint on
the free flow of ideas in the commercial marketplace.71
This is not a view without opposition. Judge James Buckley,
in a concurring opinion for the D.C. Circuit, reasoned that an
organization
other influences of some participants severely weaken and narrow the competition of
ideas... through a predominance of ideas that defend the varied advantages of the ad-
vantaged." Charles E. Lindblom, Inquiry and Change: The Troubled Attempt to Under-
stand and Shape Society 81 (Yale University Press, 1990). He identifies corporations and
their executives as being among advantaged elites and suggests further that their advan-
tage is enhanced by the fact that on many issues, "big business approaches unanimity." Id
at 105. C. Edwin Baker suggests that the corporate advantage within the marketplace of
ideas goes beyond the massive financial resources that corporations expend in the pro-
duction and delivery of speech; he argues that there are also secondary benefits of organi-
zation that deliver a comparative advantage in that members of the public must invest in
building organizations to address issues effectively. C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and
Freedom of Speech 349 n124 (Oxford University Press, 1989). See also, Herbert I. Schiller,
Culture Inc. 46-65 (Oxford University Press, 1989); Herbert I. Schiller, Information
Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America 43-56 (Routledge, 1996).
Robert Posch is vice president of legal affairs for Doubleday Book and Music Clubs
and publishes a regular column (Legal Outlook) in Direct Marketing magazine.
70 Robert J. Posch, Jr., The 25-Year Privacy Debate has an Institutional Memory,
Direct Marketing (Apr 1996). Robert J. Posch, Jr., Commercial free speech. The Argument
for Our Side, Direct Marketing (Feb 1983); Robert J. Posch, Jr., Speak up: Only Way to
Counter Legal Threat to List Usage, Direct Marketing 154 (Apr 1984); Richard Barton
[moderator], Privacy vs Free Speech. A debate between Robert Posch and Roy Schwedelson,
Direct Marketing 41 (May 1989).
71 Robert J. Posch, Jr., How The Law(s) of 'Privacy' Impact Your Business, Direct
Marketing 74, 80 (Oct 1987).
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has no more right to convert such a list to its own com-
mercial uses than Thomas Jefferson would have had to
steal the quill from which he fashioned the pen with
which he wrote the Declaration of Independence. A list
of names and addresses has no more direct a relation-
ship to speech than a goose feather had to the Declara-
tion. Each can be put to uses that may facilitate the
production of speech; neither is speech itself.72
Although the relative openness and accessibility of
cyberspace excites the democratic imagination of advocates like
Howard Rheingold,73 the corporate presence seems likely to be
felt here as well. Excitement about the coming of
"cyberdemocracy" as an era of grass-roots political activism in
which "virtual PACs" will be organized by individual citizen ac-
tivists is based in part on the successful intervention of such
groups in the transformation of Congress in 1994.74 There is,
however, little basis for assuming that the lower costs of estab-
lishing a presence in cyberspace will mean that individual citi-
zens and associations representing consumer and labor interests
will be able to use that presence to overcome, or even balance,
the influence of the corporate sector.75
First, because of their resources, corporations and their orga-
nizations will be able to overwhelm the influence of the average
individual speaker with the number, quality and sophistication of
their networked communications. Second, businesses will be able
to take advantage of the particular features of cyberspace that
will facilitate the segmentation and targeting of political messag-
es, thereby increasing the efficiency of those communications.
Third, and somewhat ironically, participation by the general
public in those parts of the Internet environment that were de-
signed to facilitate the development of the public sphere and the
enhancement of political discourse will actually provide addition-
al information that can be used to improve the targeting of stra-
tegic messages. One public relations organization already pro-
motes its ability to provide business customers with assessments
72 Federal Election Commission v International Funding Institute, Inc., 969 F2d 1110,
1119 (DC Cir 1992) (Buckley concurring).
" See, generally, Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the
Electronic Frontier (Addison-Wesley, 1993).
71 See, for example, Rick Henderson, Cyberdemocracy, Reason 43 (Apr 1995); Robert
Wright, Hyperdemocracy, Time 15 (Jan 23, 1995).
7' Herbert I. Schiller, Information Inequality (cited in note 68) (see especially ch 5).
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of this kind of cybertalk as well as assistance in framing an ap-
propriate corporate response.7"
II. SOURCES OF INFORMATION
As I have suggested, the concern with privacy in cyberspace
is a concern with the uses to which information about individuals
and groups can be used to affect the quality of the options that
people face in their roles as employees, citizens, and consumers. I
have described the ways businesses use this information to im-
prove their position in relation to the individuals they encounter
in each of these roles. I turn now to a brief review of the ways
this information is currently gathered and is likely to be gathered
in the future.
A. Current Sources of Personal Information
Corporations have a myriad of sources for acquiring informa-
tion about individuals. The corporation has the greatest capacity
for gathering information about individuals through the employ-
ment relationship. With the exception of the family and a few
other special long-term relationships, the employer/employee
relationship is the closest. It is also the relationship in which the
asymmetry in power is the greatest.77 Generally, with regard to
employment, consumer, and political relations, this asymmetry is
likely to be greater when the corporation enjoys some degree of
monopoly power, and where, as a result, the individual has fewer
opportunities to control disclosure by terminating the relation-
ship.
This information may be gathered through direct responses
to inquiries, including applications and surveys. Information may
also be captured as a by-product of transaction-generated
recordkeeping, such as those that record sales and purchases
made in supermarkets. Phil Agre describes a variety of tracking
systems used to keep records of such transactions and refers to
the process generally as one in which data are "captured."78 The
7' The advertisement claims "eWatch can scan thousands of Internet and commercial
online forums and news groups continuously for messages about your campaign, your
issues, your constituency and your competitors. Reporting this wealth of information is
just the beginning. Well help you draft and place the appropriate responses." Campaigns
& Elections 35 (July 1995).
" Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, The Political Economy of Contested Exchange,
in Thomas E. Wartenbert, ed, Rethinking Power 202-05 (State University of New York
Press, 1992).
"' Philip E. Agre, Surveillance and Capture: Two Models of Privacy, 10 Information
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raw data gathered by these automated systems are transformed
into strategic intelligence through increasingly sophisticated sta-
tistical methods, many of which are available in standardized
software for use in a personal computer environment.
When there is no existing relationship between corporation
and individual, or when that relationship does not provide suffi-
cient information, corporations can acquire individual and group
information through hundreds of organizations that market lists,
provide access to consumer databases, and offer related informa-
tion services."9 The United States Government remains a prima-
ry source of information about individuals that has proven to be
of vital importance to corporations. The Census, for example, pro-
vides a "windfall of data" about citizens. While there are confi-
dentiality requirements that severely restrict the ability of users
to gather individually identifiable information, the kinds of data
that are available are still critical to the development of useful
profiles of groups to which individuals can be reliably assigned.
1. Surveys and market research.
It is important to understand the role of surveys and market
research in the development of profiles. Organizations may col-
lect information from a sample of individuals selected to repre-
sent the populations from which they are drawn. These respon-
dents may or may not know what the purposes of the inquiry are
when they respond to questions about their knowledge, attitudes,
and behavior. As often as not, people provide information in
surveys because they believe that they are improving the quality
of products that businesses provide. s
The information derived from specialized surveys is com-
bined with information from larger surveys, such as the United
States Census and periodic surveys of consumers."' These data
are used to develop the categories or classes to which individuals
may be assigned based on whatever limited information their
interaction with an organization may generate. Thus, a person's
Society 101, 106-07 (1994).
' Eleanor Novek, Nikhil Sinha, and Oscar Gandy, The value of your name, 12 Media,
Culture and Society 525, 526-28 (1990); Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Toward a Political Economy
of Personal Information, 10 Critical Studies in Mass Communication 70, 85-88 (1993)(cited
in note 6).
s' Stephen Schleifer, Trends in Attitudes Toward and Participation in Survey Re-
search, 50 Pub Opinion Q 17 (1986).
"I George T. Duncan, Thomas B. Jabine, and Virginia A. de Wolfe, eds, Private Lives
and Public Policies: Confidentiality and Accessibility of Government Statistics 8-9 (Nation-
al Academy Press, 1993).
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zip code may be used to assign an estimated income on the basis
of the average or median income within this zip code. If addition-
al information is available, such as race or gender, then this
information can be combined, enhancing the level of detail in the
profile. Furthermore, any information gathered directly from the
individual can be used to replace estimated information and to
improve the accuracy of estimation models.
Unless it is explicitly barred by law or by an actively en-
forced industry code of fair information practices, information
that a corporation may gather from individual employees or con-
sumers can be utilized to influence individuals in their roles as
citizens. Corporate publications developed for communication
with employees about corporate status and policies frequently
contain policy-relevant content. Information gathered from appli-
cants, information developed through surveys, monitoring, or
other interactions, and information gathered from third parties
may be used to direct targeted appeals to employees in an effort
to influence their political activity, such as writing to Congress or
to state legislatures.
Information about consumers is similarly useful when a firm
seeks to oppose government policy. For example, Phillip Morris is
reported to have used its lists of "tens of millions of smokers" to
organize a grass-roots organization called the National Smokers
Alliance to help the industry combat increasingly restrictive
legislation.82
2. List vendors.
Commercial vendors of information about individuals are an
important source of information relevant to all three relations
between individuals and corporations. Mary Culnafi and Patricia
Regan discuss the importance of political mailing lists and the
ways they can be compiled directly or with the assistance of list
vendors.83 They identify a number of list vendors who specialize
in providing information about individuals' political orientation.
These compiled lists use public records, census data, and, on
occasion, survey data acquired from third parties.8' Sophisticat-
ed vendors use a variety of "enhancement" techniques that in-
David A. Andelman, Big Tobacco=Big Money=Big Headaches, 83 Management Rev
48, 51 (1994).
' Mary J. Culnan and Patricia M. Regan, Privacy Issues and the Creation of Cam-
paign Mailing Lists, 11 Information Society 85, 87-88 (1995) (cited in note 43).
Id at 93.
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clude "matching" several files against each other. On the basis of
a common identifier, such as the social security number or an ad-
dress, a "match" provides the basis for combining the information
from two discrete files into an elaborated profile of an individual.
Jeff Smith identifies six kinds of data indicative of purchas-
ing power, three indicative of purchasing activity, one detailing
shopping psychographics, and five kinds of basic demographic
information that one can acquire on the open market for personal
information.85 A single vendor was able to provide all this infor-
mation to one of its banking clients.86 Smith indicated further
that none of the firms he researched had policies that would limit
the combination of information from different sources.87
State governments are an important source of data about
individuals ranging from the information included in drivers'
license applications to the details required when individuals are
called to jury duty.88 Many states either market this information
directly or license it for sale through professional list vendors.
Even though the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 199489 limit-
ed states' ability to sell access to motor-vehicle records, the law
included several permissible uses that reflect the primacy of
business interests.90
Since much of this information is now available from vendors
online, and thus available quickly with relatively little effort and
without the inconvenience of standing in long lines to gain access
to public records, the use of such services will likely increase.
The National Telecommunications and Information Administra-
tion ("NTIA") identifies LEXIS and CompuServe as being among
the major information providers who are joining hundreds of
smaller entrepreneurs seeking to transform public records into a
reliable cash stream.91
8 H. Jeff Smith, Managing Privacy: Information Technology and Corporate America
114-15 (University of North Carolina Press, 1994).
" Id at 112.
87 Id at 103.
Robert Gellman, Center for Democracy and Technology Consultation on Public
Records, Public Records: Access, Privacy, and Public Policy 68-69 (Mar 28, 1995).
18 USC §§ 2721 et seq (1994).
'o 18 USC §§ 2721-2725 (1994). For example, business may use the information to
"verify the accuracy of personal information submitted by the individual to a business"
and the statute provides an opportunity for individuals to object or to "opt-out" of bulk
distribution of marketing information. 18 USC §§ 2721(b)(3XA), (b)(12).
" Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector Use of Telecommunications-
Related Personal Information, 59 Fed Reg 6842 n4 (1994).
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B. Cyberspace and the Capture of Personal Information
Cyberspace is a relatively popular term for the global com-
puter network that "transcends physical space and national
boundaries."92 A competing metaphor, the "information super-
highway," is attractive to the Federal Government which sees the
network as a public good-a necessary infrastructure similar to
the network of roads that supports development through inter-
state transportation.
With the rapid commercialization of that portion of the su-
perhighway known as the World Wide Web, notions of an "elec-
tronic marketplace" or "electronic shopping mall" are also gaining
currency. Uneasiness about the connections between this market-
place and the "marketplace of ideas" in the evolving public
sphere raises concerns about access, power, and accountability.
The networked environment of cyberspace will become in-
creasingly important for the pursuit of corporate interests in each
of the three primary relationships I have discussed. It seems,
however, that the role of the individual as consumer has attract-
ed the greatest share of corporate attention. The dramatic in-
crease in the commercial presence on the Internet-as measured
by the increase in the registration of corporate domains and in
the numbers of corporate "home pages" on the multimedia seg-
ment of the global network known as the World Wide
Web-provides strong evidence of that interest. 3 What appears
to be so attractive to these firms is the ease with which one can
produce a specially tailored message for delivery to an "audience
of one." Personal information derived from interactions between
individuals and networked computers will be the primary source
of guidance for the design of these messages.
C. Surveillance and Capture in a Network Environment
The following discussion aims to provide a broad outline of
the information-gathering features of cyberspace that will con-
tribute to the narrowing of the scope of reasonable expectations
for control of personal information in this environment.
92 Dorothy E. Denning and Herbert S. Lin, eds, Rights and Responsibilities of Partici-
pants in Networked Communities 12 (National Academy Press, 1994).
" Dianne Trommer, Opportunities Abound for Business on Internet-However, Net
Access is Still Far from Universal, Electronic Buyers' News 66 (Mar 25, 1996) (available in
the LEXIS/NEXIS library); Jane Hall, Cyberspace for Sale: From Madison Avenue to
Silicon Valley, Companies are Rushing to Market Products Over the Internet, LA Times D1
(May 21, 1995).
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1. Identifiers.
Within the environment of networked computers, reliable
forms of identification and authentication are believed to be of
paramount importance. s4 The use of transaction-processing sys-
tems, programmed decision-making systems, and decision-sup-
port systems nearly always "entail[ ] the collection and process-
ing of personal information."9 5 While it is standard practice for
information systems to require identification and authentication
for most transactions, it is not at all clear that the user's identity
is necessary.9"
The unique identification system for computers, or IP ad-
dresses, facilitates the routing of messages, including the return
of messages that were undeliverable for one reason or another,
and the restriction of access to machines, sites, or users to those
who are authorized on the basis of membership, fees paid, or
presumed legitimate interest. Here, the use of passwords increas-
es the system operator's confidence that only authorized access
occurs. Network protocols vary in the amount of detail they, re-
veal about the routes or paths messages take, but it is not un-
common for the identity of each of the hosts that have been in-
volved in forwarding a message to be included in the information
forwarded downstream.97
9' Comment, Who Are You?: Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U Pitt L Rev
1177 (1994) (discussing the availability of anonymity as it exists in various forms of
electronic media).
"5 Registratiekamer (Netherlands) and Information and Privacy Commissioner
(Ontario, Canada), 1 Privacy-Enhancing Technologies: The Path to Anonymity 5 (Aug
1995).
9 Privacy commissioners argue that a user's identity is needed only for authorization
and accounting. Other functions can proceed by means of "pseudo-identities." See 1
Privacy-Enhancing Technologies (cited in note 95). See also Roger Clarke, When do they
need to know 'Whodunnit?' The Justification for Transaction Identification; The Scope of
Transaction Anonymity and Pseudonymity (background paper for Computers, Freedom &
Privacy Conference, 1995) (Mar 20, 1995 version).
" While using a resource offered online, http//www.uiuc.edu/cgi-bin/info, as recom-
mended in an article, A Note About Web Browsers & Privacy, published online by Ed
Kubaitis at http//www.uiuc.edu/-ejk/www-privacy.html (Nov 20, 1994), I received a de-
tailed specification that included the referring server, the browser software, my remote IP
address, as well as the number assigned to my machine in my office at work, which was
part. of the identification of my registered university site. At Michael Froomkin's sugges-
tion (e-mail, Nov 27, 1995), I pursued additional information about information-gathering
features being developed by Netscape Communications Corporation for their currently
dominant web browser. In describing a technique ("cookies") for enhancing web-server
data management, Netscape suggests:
This simple mechanism provides a powerful new tool which enables a host of
new types of applications to be written for web-based environments. Shopping
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Depending upon the protections designed into the system,
and upon the level of awareness and care exercised by the indi-
vidual to protect her own privacy interests, information about her
use of networked resources may be available to a broad range of
unseen observers. Institutional networks, especially those based
on UNIX servers, support a utility ("finger") that allows anyone
to identify other users of the system and to monitor what they
are doing on the system at that time."8
Because of the growing demand for personal information,
organizations will use readily available software to gather infor-
mation about individual access to data. The corporate interest in
the individual as consumer is clearly expressed in relation to
information about the nature of visits to World Wide Web
sites.99 Corporations with a presence on the network will gather
information directly in much the same way they capture informa-
tion from other transactions, only this time the capture is likely
to be automatic and thus more likely to be gathered without the
individual being aware of that fact.
2. Telephone transaction-generated information.
Thomas McManus defines telephone transaction-generated
information ["TTGI"] as the "information generated by telephone
usage and transactions related to telephone service." 0 In addi-
tion to information about telephone subscribers gathered from
application forms, credit checks, and the billing information gen-
erated by some fee-based uses of the telephone, 1' call-detail re-
applications can now store information about the currently selected items, for
fee services can send back registration information and free the client from
typing a user-id on next connection, sites can store per-user preferences on the
client, and have the client supply those preferences every time that site is con-
nected to.
See Persistent Client State Http Cookies, Netscape Handbook (info@netscape.com) (1995).
Other Web browsers are also reported to support cookies, see J.H.B., Net.News: The Trou-
ble With Cookies, Netguide 24 (May 1996).
Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 Yale L J 1743, 1748 (1995).
Who Can Measure the Net?, The Economist 61 (July 22, 1995); Amy C. Shurr, Look
Who's Surfing; Tools for Qualifying Your Audience; Auditing Web Site Visitors on the
Internet; Business on the Net: The New Gold Rush; Industry Trend or Event, 12 PC Week
102 (October 30, 1995); Laurie Flynn, In Search of Nielsens for the Internet, NY Times 37
(May 29, 1995).
100 Thomas E. McManus, Telephone Transaction-Generated Information: Rights and
Restrictions 1 (Harvard University Program on Information Resources Policy, 1990) (cited
in note 41).
" Such as personal information required for third party information services billed
through the carrier or access provider.
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cords provide the most comprehensive and potentially most valu-
able information about individuals. These records provide the
details of "exchange and interexchange phone calls including the
date and time of call, the number called, the calling number, the
geographic location of the called number, the duration of the call,
and the charge."' 2 In addition, for purposes of forwarding calls
to portable telephones, cellular and personal communications
service ("PCS") instruments, information about geographic loca-
tion must be continually available within the network.0 3 Many
forms of TTGI share the potential to affect a person's "right to
control the release of information about one's status, preferences,
and activities selectively, even if there is no risk of embarrass-
ment or harassment."1' 4
The development and implementation of several calling num-
ber identification services, such as the Custom Local Area
Switching Service ("CLASS") or Caller-ID services in general, has
generated considerable concern about the ways in which these
services facilitate the capture of TTGI.05 Although the claim is
made that individuals have only a minimal interest in their tele-
phone numbers, it is the association of that number with an
implied interest or relationship with another number or service
that makes TTGI so valuable."0 6 Other number identification
technologies ("ANI") have also been identified with the capture of
personal information. Consumers generally were not aware that
calls made to 800 and 900 number information services, espe-
cially to "976" or other sexually oriented services, generated
transaction records.10
7
McManus, Telephone Transaction-Generated Information at 9 (cited in note 41).
103 Marvin A. Sirbu, Telecommunications Technology and Infrastructure, in A National
Information Network: Changing Our Lives in the 21st Century 155 (Institute for Informa-
tion Studies, 1992).
104 See generally, Glenn Chatmas Smith, We've Got Your Number! (Is it Constitutional
to Give It Out?): Caller Identification Technology and the Right to Informational Privacy,
37 UCLA L Rev 145, 219 (1989).
"00 Id. Caller-ID services involve the sale or rental of devices that display the billing
number of the incoming call before the call is answered. More sophisticated systems in
some service areas may also forward the billing name of the calling party. The instru-
ments are able to capture and store this information, including the time of day at which
the call was made.
"06 While the decision of the court in Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 742 (1979),
asserted that calling parties have no reasonable expectation of privacy in numbers that
they dial, Glenn Smith suggests that the fact that an individual's telephone number may
be published in a directory cannot be compared to the sensitivity of the information indi-
cating that this person called an AIDS hotline. Smith, 37 UCLA L Rev at 202 (cited in
note 104).
107 Rohan Samarjiva and Roopali Mukherjee, Regulation of 976 Services and Dial-A-
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3. E-mail.
The ability of people to access business computers remotely,
including those who occasionally work from home or who must
reach headquarters from the field, increases the normalization of
e-mail use, and consequently, the likelihood that employees will
use the company e-mail system for personal communications,'
that may be subject to occasional, or even routine surveillance.
The importance of e-mail for intra- and inter-organizational com-
munications" 9 has meant that managers have become con-
cerned about nonbusiness uses of this resource and have imple-
mented tracking and surveillance routines similar to those devel-
oped for use with traditional telephones."0
One survey of employers indicated that a substantial propor-
tion of them have engaged in searches of employee communica-
tions, generally without the employees' knowledge or consent."'
As with employee use of the telephone, a tension exists between
the expectation that corporate resources will be used primarily
for business-related purposes and the expectation of the employee
that not even her business-related conversations will be subject
to surveillance. In general, employers argue that they "need to
reserve the right to electronically monitor job performance and
work-related activities in order to investigate and prevent theft,
fraud, insider trading, drug dealing, and other illegal conduct, as
well as to assure productivity, efficiency, and quality control.""'
Porn: Implications for the Intelligent Network, Telecommunications Policy 151, 163-64
(Apr 1991).
'" Michael Putzel, New Voice of America: Increasing Numbers of People Use E-mail to
Stay in Touch, Boston Globe 65 (Apr 29, 1994) (discussing increased use of e-mail for per-
sonal and family communications). A recent study by the Rand Corporation underscores
the value of e-mail, suggesting that access to e-mail and to other Internet services might
be included in the definition of "universal service." See generally, Robert H. Anderson, et
al, Universal Access to E-Mail: Feasibility and Societal Implications (RAND, 1995).
" Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch your E-mail! Employee E-mail Monitoring and Privacy
Law in the Age of the "Electronic Sweatshop", 28 John Marshall L Rev 139, 140 n8 (1994)
("Corporate E-mail has grown 83 percent among the Fortune 2000 firms between 1991
and 1993, and nine out of ten locations employing over 1,000 workers in the U.S. now use
[] E-mail.'); See also, Erini Doss and Michael C. Loui, Ethics.and the Privacy of Electronic
Mail, 11 Information Society 223 (1995).
1' Comment, E-mail and Voice Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap
Statute, 44 Am U L Rev 219 (1994).
"' Charles PiUller, Bosses with X-Ray Eyes, Macworld 118, 123 (July 1993) (indicating
that 21.6 percent of employers engaged in such searches).
11. Lee, 28 John Marshall L Rev at 145 (cited in note 109).
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The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986
("ECPA")"3 amended the 1968 federal wiretap law"' to pro-
tect previously unprotected forms of electronic communications.
However, the ECPA still allows substantial leeway for businesses
to monitor employee communications. For example, one reading
of the ECPA defines the employer as the provider of the commu-
nication service and therefore entitled to greater latitude in mon-
itoring stored communications where they may be considered to
be a company record."' Thus, e-mail represents just one more
means of monitoring employees, and as a technical form that
generates relatively permanent records of communication, it may
be easier to "intercept" than a telephone call that takes place in
real time. These records can be screened at leisure, and indeed,
may be screened by means of automated programs that scan text
in search of names, phrases, or other references that indicate the
nature, source, or target of the communication.
In the case of the telephone, a limited amount of personal
use, such as in the coordination of family obligations, has been
treated as reasonable. However, courts have held that when
supervisors continue to listen to such private or personal conver-
sations beyond the time needed to determine that it is a personal
call, such interceptions are impermissible."'
On the other hand, numerous interpretive complications
have produced uncertainty about what kinds of interception are
generally barred by law. One widely shared perception of the
leeway granted corporations is that some forms of monitoring
ought not to be treated as interceptions as long as they were
made in the "ordinary course of business.""7 Employees whose
work primarily involves use of the telephone for interaction with
consumers are subject to frequent monitoring, ostensibly for
purposes of assessing performance and ensuring that quality
services are provided."' The courts generally have held that no
reasonable expectation of privacy exists when an employee uses
an employer's telecommunications equipment, and employers can
113 Pub L No 99-508, 100 Stat 1848 (1986), amending 18 USC §§ 2510-2521 (1994).
" Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 USC §§ 2510-2521 (1994).
.. Comment, 44 Am U L Rev at 238 (cited in note 110) (explaining stored communica-
tions provisions of ECPA).
116 Watkins v L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F2d 577, 584 (11th Cir 1983); Deal v Spears, 980
F2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir 1992).
11 See for example, Comment, 44 Am U L Rev at 235-36 (cited in note 109) (explain-
ing "ordinary course of business" exceptions to ECPA); Lee, 28 John Marshall L Rev at
144-45 (cited in note 109).
I" Comment, 44 Am U L Rev at 239-40 (cited in note 110).
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readily demonstrate a legitimate business interest in intercepting
or monitoring business-related communications."'
It is also important to note the critical distinction between
gaining access to the content of a communication in real time and
gaining access to the record of a transaction. While individuals
may have some expectation of privacy with regard to the content
of personal phone calls made on the job, there is no similar ex-
pectation regarding the use of call-detail records that would allow
employers to make assessments of an employee's use of the tele-
phone. 2 ° Yet, there is frequently more than enough information
available within call-detail records for employers to initiate ac-
tions against employees, including more formal investigations of
their performance, their contact with competitors, journalists, or
government officials. These transaction records may include the
identification of places called, as well as places from which calls
were received, time of day, and the length of the call or contact.
With computers, transaction logs may become even more de-
tailed.
4. Computer transaction logs: web browsers.
A number of commercial firms provide software that facili-
tates the production of useful information by analyzing data
generated by visits to an organization's server. 2' The dramatic
increase in corporate presence on the Internet through multime-
"1 See, for example, Briggs v American Air Filter Co., 455 F Supp 179 (ND Ga 1978),
afld 630 F2d 414 (5th Cir 1980) (holding that where manager of employer's branch office
used business extension phone to monitor conversation between employee and former
employee because manager had reason to believe that employee was disclosing confiden-
tial information in violation of a loyalty agreement, manager's use of business telephone
was in the ordinary course of employer's business and was therefore exempt from provi-
sions of the Omnibus Crime Control & Safe Streets Act prohibiting interception of wire
communications); James v Newspaper Agency Corp., 591 F2d 579 (10th Cir 1979) (holding
that because supervisory personnel monitored employees' phone calls to give training and
instruction as to how to better deal with the public and to serve as some protection from
abusive phone calls, and employees were notified, in writing, of this decision, the
company's activity was exempted from act making it unlawful to intercept wire communi-
cation); Simmons v Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 452 F Supp 392 (WD Okla 1978),
afld 611 F2d 342 (10th Cir 1979) (holding that company's monitoring of phone calls did
not violate constitutional right of privacy and fell within exemption of Omnibus Crime
Control & Safe Streets Act). See also Lee, 28 John Marshall L Rev at 139 (cited in note
109) (concluding that current law appears to favor employers in e-mail monitoring in the
workplace); David Neil King, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector Workplace: Protection
from Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging "Privacy Gap", 67 S Cal L Rev 441 (1994)
(suggesting legislation for improving protection of employee privacy rights).
120 See Smith v Maryland, 442 US 735, 738 (1978) (holding that a telephone user has
no expectation of privacy in a phone number dialed).
21 See generally references in note 99.
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dia World Wide Web ("Web") pages is supporting an active com-
petition among audience assessment firms to deliver the most
useful information that particular servers and user clients might
provide.'22 While there presently are some difficulties in estab-
lishing the unique identification of individuals who visit any site,
it is recognized that such identification "would make the Web the
best measured of all commercial media."'23 Rather than being
based on samples, log analysis would provide a complete and con-
tinuous census of all hits made by individuals on a particular
corporate page or on an associated link pursued from that page.
In the view of observers of the emerging industry in Web mea-
surement,
[t]he big task for the new Web-monitoring services is
analyzing the raw traffic statistics and turning them
into useful marketing data, like determining how many
times the same people viewed an ad, how long they
lingered and what route they took to get there. Adver-
tisers might also want to know what Web site they
visited next, to determine where else it might pay to
advertise to reach similar types of people.'
As I have suggested, information derived from an analysis of
information-seeking behavior has substantial utility for enhanc-
ing the "resolution" or level of useful detail in the profiles of
individuals and groups.
Commercial providers of access to electronic periodicals, such
as Wired Magazine's electronic alternative, HotWired, require
users to register a unique identifier in addition to a user name
and a password.'25 This provides a reliable means of linking indi-
viduals with their informational choices.'26 Competitors recog-
" Kevin Goldman, Nielsen, I/Pro Form Internet Joint Venture, Wall Street J B2
(Sept 6, 1995). One of I/Pro's early ventures involved the "$1 million Internet Hunt from
Compuserve." Compuserve Launches the World's First $1 Million Internet Scavenger Hunt,
PR Newswire (June 20, 1995). According to the promotional material, "The $1 million
Internet Hunt provides an unprecedented opportunity for sponsors to promote their
offerings and receive valuable demographic information in return.... The I/PRO system
will allow CompuServe to easily register participants, track usage patterns and quantify
activity generated by the Hunt while protecting end-users' privacy." Id.
123 Denman F. Maroney, Security, Privacy and Marketing on the World Wide Web, 4
PRIVACY Forum Digest (Sept 15, 1995) (available online at
http'//www.vortex.com/privacy/priv.04.20.Z).
12 Flynn, NY Times at 40 (cited in note 99).
125 Daniel Dern, Net.Dern, Netguide 29 (Jan 1996).
126 As in other circumstances, those who are especially privacy sensitive, and suffi-
ciently sophisticated, such as the "cyberpunks" described to me by Michael Froomkin (e-
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nize that the amount of time and the complexity of the registra-
tion process may serve to reduce the number of individuals who
actually follow through and become regular users of their ser-
vice. 7 However, the development of a "universal registration
system" is reportedly under way. Such a system would allow
individuals to "access content at multiple sites without having to
fill out multiple registration forms, and content providers [would
be] able to collect demographic information without compromis-
ing the privacy of end users."28
One of the features of the "browsers" or special programs
that facilitate searching the Web is the use of an internal or local
area network ("LAN") directory cache'29 to record the unique
addresses of individual "pages" or file identifiers that one has
visited. This is an automatic feature that makes use of the net-
work more efficient. When enabled (the default), links to files or
locations that have been visited previously appear in a different
color on whatever page or site one is displaying at the time. Indi-
vidual users might disable this feature on some machines (like
the Apple Macintosh) by setting the preference for cache deletion
to "now." Others may have to actively delete the cache from the
directory. This means that depending upon the nature of the
access rights available to other users, or upon the policies estab-
mail, Nov 27, 1995), may use commonly known ID numbers and passwords to subvert the
intentions of information providers who require user identification. Daniel Dern notes the
possibility of using a "proxy server" to shield identifying information. Dern, Netguide at
30 (cited in note 125).
,27 Registration for HotWired required me to answer sets of questions designed to
establish my identity, my association with an institution, my e-mail address, and an
assessment of my level of computer sophistication and experience with online systems. In
addition, a unique identification key, described as an authentication device of value to
their supporters, was forwarded to my e-mail address, but the process required me to sign
on again, using name and password, and then to provide this code.
28 This is a reference to the L/CODE Universal Registration system being developed
by Nielsen Media Research, the premier supplier of audience assessment services for the
broadcast and cable industry. Nielsen Media Research and I/PRO Join Forces to Measure
the Internet, Business Wire, Lexis/Nexis (Sept 5, 1995). See also, Goldman, Wall Street J
at B2 (cited in note 122). As I discuss later on, the use of demographic information may
not raise the kinds of privacy concerns traditionally associated with personal, or "individ-
ually identifiable information," but the use of demographic information is quite useful for
the purposes of classifying and characterizing individuals and groups in ways that sup-
port discrimination.
" The Netscape Handbook describes a cache as a temporary store. What is a Cache
and How Does it Work?, Netscape Handbook (available online at
http'//www.chicago.avenew.com.infodesk/help.atozindex.html) (1995). If you wish to see a
page that you have already downloaded, rather than going out onto the network to
capture it again, the client will display that page from the cache specifically for the
purpose of reducing network traffic.
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lished by the system administrator, highly detailed records of the
kinds of information sites a user had visited may be gathered,
stored, and used for administrative or other purposes.
130
5. Newsgroups and bulletin boards.
Because of the growing importance of cyberspace as an arena
for public discussion among that part of the population possess-
ing modems or direct connections to the Internet, it is not sur-
prising to see that firms have begun to provide services that
track the discussion of issues in newsgroups and online fora in
the same way that summaries of popular media are subjected to
content analysis. 13' Amid considerable public controversy
around the sexually explicit character of discussions within this
environment of shared communication, some system administra-
tors have limited the availability of certain newsgroups. 3' Un-
suspecting participants in some Usenet newsgroups might be sur-
prised and concerned to learn that a commercially sponsored
service provides boolean subject and author searching of an ex-
tensive subset of newsgroups. The output of a search is provided
in a hypertext markup language ("HTML") format so that click-
ing on the name of an author connects you with a profile of that
author, including the number of recent posts the author made to
specific newsgroups, as well as a summary index indicating what
percentage of the posts were met with a follow-up response. In-
formation about the service from its home page 133 suggested
that "researchers have turned to Usenet to identify experts or
uncover areas where research is needed." 3 "4 The author profile
"help[s] you assess the value of an article by showing you some
useful statistics on Usenet articles originating from a particular
e-mail address.' 31 5 This and similar programs 36 that scan
13' David Wilson describes the great variety in the official policy that system adminis-
trators have established and enforce with regard to computer records or transaction logs.
David L. Wilson, The Network Has Eyes, Chronicle of Higher Educ A17 (July 21, 1995).
Observers note that "wihile the ability to flush the cache gives users a small amount of
control over the information stored on their own computers, they are helpless to prevent
records being created on other Internet computers that they may visit." Id at A18.
3 ' PR Newswire announced the availability of its eWatch subscription service in Cam-
paigns & Elections 35 (July 1995). They claimed to be able to "scan thousands of Internet
and commercial online forums and news groups continuously for messages." Id.
" See, for example, Paul De Groat, Sun Setting on Internet's Frontier Days, Montreal
Gazette F6 (Feb 13, 1995); Reaction to Compuserve Access Limits Upset Enthusiasts, The
Milwaukee Journal Sentinal 1 (Dec 30, 1995).
" httpj/www.dejanews.com. One test identified an active poster: 125 articles in a
month, with 96 percent follow-ups, with five primary groups posted to.
1 Deja News: It's What You Need, http'J/www.dejanews.com/onwhy.html (1996).
... Deja News Frequently Asked Questions: Searches,
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Internet sites gathering data may provide similar benefits. How-
ever, other uses of this service may raise some concern about the
consequences that might flow from knowledge of one's active
participation in newsgroup discussions. For example, Steve
Madere, president of Deja News in Austin, Texas, reportedly
"checks the Usenet posts of job applicants to get clues about their
technical skills and their public conduct. 'I can see if they posted
in an intelligent or offensive way.""37 Hasty words posted to a
discussion group may, as this example suggests, have conse-
quences for a person's employability.
Users of bulletin boards and newsgroups who have a sub-
stantial concern about threats to their privacy may maintain
anonymity through a number of anonymous servers or remailing
services that remove any identifying information. However, these
services may still subject the individual to identification if the
system administrator is forced to reveal the identity of clients
under court order3 8 or in response to a well-constructed inquiry
by a "researcher.""'
http'//www.dejanews.com/help/dnfaq.html (1996). See also, Australian National University
Library Access on Outreach Team, Introduction to the Internet,
httpl/info.anu.edu.au/courses/intro/wkbk/loc.html (Feb 1996).
" Thomas E. Weber describes the use of Alta Vista, Open Text and other "search en-
gines" or "spiders" to collect the material stored in World Wide Web sites as providing the
possibility for "fame" in addition to more mundane uses, such as finding former class-
mates. World-Wide Fame is at Your Fingertips, Wall Street J B1 (Mar 4, 1996).
'37 Mitch Betts, Privacy fades for Web visitors, 2(3) Privacy & Am Bus 19 (Oct 1995)
(quoting Steve Madere).
" Comment, Who Are You? Identity and Anonymity in Cyberspace, 55 U Pitt L Rev
1177, 1205-1207 (1994) (cited in note 91) (discussing the applicability of a standard like
the Title III Wiretap Standard to compel sysops to reveal the identity of users); Larry
•Detweiler, Identity, Privacy, and Anonymity on the Internet § 2.4,
ftp://www.cdrom.com/pub/security/coast/doc/policy/Eff-Poli-
cy/Privacy/privacy-anonymity.faq (Aug 1, 1993).
" A high volume debate was carried out through the Internet in response to a pre-
publication release of an article by Marty Rimm, Marketing Pornography on the Informa-
tion Superhighway: A Survey of 917,410 Images, Descriptions, Short Stories, and Anima-
tions Downloaded 8.5 Million Times by Consumers in Over 2000 Cities in Forty Countries,
Provinces, and Territories, 83 Georgetown L J 1849 (1995). Rimm does not describe
precisely how the research team obtained access to the records of bulletin board users. He
reports that "the research team obtained demographics from several leading 'adult' BBS
which indicate the age, sex, and city of origin of subscribers. These demographics were
based on verified credit card information and were obtained either directly from the
logfiles of 'adult' BBS or various methodologies developed by the research team program-
mers." Id at 1895. Rimm also claimed to have utilized the kind of access to records that
UNIX computers provide to "examine the online habits of 4,227 users" of what many
presume to have been Carnegie Mellon University's computer system. Id at 1865. A
detailed critique (accessed July 5, 1995, but updated regularly) was provided by Donna L.
Hoffman and Thomas P. Novak, The Cyberporn Debate,
http'//www2000.ogsm.vanderbilt.edu/cyberporn.debate.cgi.
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6. Remote sensing.
There is no imaginable end to the computer-based systems
that generate information useful to developing predictive models
and to controlling individual behavior. Anthony Giddens' 4 of-
fers the concept of "time-space distanciation" to describe how
social systems of control can be extended in time and space.
Those in authority can develop and coordinate relationships with-
out the requirement of being in the presence of persons being
controlled through observation. Telecommunications facilitate the
remote surveillance of individuals, and computation provides
analytical insights into aspects of personhood that are'not di-
rectly observable.
The pressure to manage more and more aspects of a complex
economic system has led governments to participate actively in
the development and implementation of sophisticated systems
that depend upon remote sensing and the capture of information
about the identity and status of individuals. The new "Intelligent
Vehicle Highway Systems" (increasingly referred to simply as
"ITS") is just the latest bit of technical debris being carried for-
ward in this rapidly moving stream."
Critical observers of the development and implementation of
ITS systems identified ten reasons why an ITS system raises
fundamental privacy concerns:
ITS applications can be used
[1.] invisibly to track a targeted individual's movements
from place to place....
2. . . . automatically to collect comprehensive informa-
tion about when and where every person travels....
3. . . . [to] create a computerized personal travel profile
which will be used to make decisions about an individ-
ual, as well as to predict and to manipulate the
individual's future choices about transportation and
other matters....
"0 Giddens is an important source of my thinking of the role of information in the
reproduction of social relations. His primary contributions are present in The Constitution
of Society (University of California Press, 1984). Critical discussions of his theoretical
contributions are available in Ian Craib, Anthony Giddens (Routledge, 1992); and David
Held and John B. Thompson, eds, Social Theory of Modern Societies: Anthony Giddens
and His Critics (Cambridge University Press, 1989).
"' See the Santa Clara Symposium on Privacy and IVHS, 11 Santa Clara Computer
& High Tech L J 13 (1995). ITS is being designed to improve the efficiency and safety of a
federally aided highway system, with corollary benefits such as reduced emissions to be
derived from reductions in traffic congestion.
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4. ... [to] aggregate, or connect up, stored information
about an individual's travel patterns with other infor-
mation regarding that individual....
5. . . . [to] use or disclose information about an
individual's travel history or profile in ways which may
both reflect him or her and affect his or her future op-
portunities and choices....
10. ... [by] [p]rivate entities, especially large corpora-
tions,... to collect, to manipulate and to disclose
transportation information about individuals and use
ITS to take over control of travel. 142
The concerns expressed by these observers are similar to
those enumerated by the National Telecommunications and In-
formation Administration ("NTIA") in its Notice of Inquiry and in
the draft proposal from NII Privacy Working Group. 143 It is in
the nature of decisionmaking which depends on the use of gener-
alized profiles and predictive models, that all varieties of infor-
mation about individuals may have predictive utility for orga-
nizations. While it is unlikely that any single bit of information,
including information about when and where one travelled on a
particular day, would pose an obvious and serious threat to any
individual's well-being; in combination, these discrete bits may
add up to a substantial risk. It is the further normalization of
this process that I have referred to as a panoptic sort'" that
generates concern among advocates of information privacy. These
are concerns about power.'" Concern about privacy is best un-
derstood as a concern about the power to discriminate.
4 Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy and Intelligent Transportation Technology, 11 Santa
Clara Computer & High Tech L J 151, 163-68 (1995).
14 Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating to Private Sector Telecommunications-Related
Information, 59 Fed Reg 6842 (Feb 11, 1994). Privacy Working Group, Information Policy
Committee, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Privacy and the National Information
Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information (Final Version
adopted, June 6, 1995).
'" Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Informa-
tion (Westview, 1993).
' John Goss states it succinctly: "the issue is not privacy per se, but the capacity of
marketing organizations to marshall, cross-reference, and analyze relatively innocent, and
even public, information on individuals and aggregations of individuals in order to obtain
social power over them." John Goss, 'We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You
Live": The Instrumental Rationality of Geodemographic Systems, 71 Econ Geography 171,
179 (1995) (cited in note 34).
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III. PRIVACY AS A PROBLEM OF DISCRIMINATION
A. Information Privacy
Alan Westin is generally credited with the most well known
definition of information privacy: "Privacy is the claim of individ-
uals, groups, or institutions to determine for themselves when,
how, and to what extent information about them is communicat-
ed to others."'46 This definition clearly establishes the privacy
interest as a concern with power and autonomy. Because the
focus on informational privacy in the United States has histori-
cally been oriented toward the development of means to restrain
the power of government,'47 and only occasionally on similar ter-
rain with regard to private corporations,"4 I have chosen to fo-
cus in this Article on the corporate threat. While Westin's defi-
nition characterizes the privacy interest as a "claim," I think it
more appropriate to discuss this interest in terms of rights.
B. A Question of Rights
A scenario presented for participants in a National Research
Council meeting on rights and responsibilities in networked com-
munities involved the collection and sale of transaction-generated
information.'49 Regulations were seen to have limited the abili-
ty of the firm to exercise the full range of rights that possession
of such information might imply.5 ° The limitations on any
actor's rights are most generally based on the actual or potential
use of force, or other instrument of power. From this perspective,
Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom 7 (Atheneum, 1967).
Priscilla M. Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public
Policy 3 (University of North Carolina Press, 1995) (cited in note 3); David H. Flaherty,
Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of Germany, Sweden,
France, Canada, and the United States 310-14 (University of North Carolina Press, 1989).
" H. Jeff Smith, Managing Privacy: Information Technology and Corporate America
168-78 (University of North Carolina Press, 1994) (cited in note 85).
"' Dorothy E. Denning and Herbert S. Lin, eds, Rights and Responsibilities of Partici-
pants in Networked Communities 105-12 (National Academy Press, 1994) (cited in note
92).
1,0 Anne Branscomb identifies a complex of rights with regard to information that
may be modified as the result of legislative debate and judicial determination. These
rights include: the right to know; the right to collect information (investigate); the right to
acquire information (from others); the right to withhold information; the right to control
its release; the right to receive compensation (exploitative right); the right to protect
information (security); the right to destroy or expunge information; and the right to cor-
rect or alter information. Anne Wells Branscomb, Property Rights in Information, in Bruce
R. Guile, ed, Information Technologies and Social Transformation 81-120 (National
Academy Press, 1985).
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the formation of rights, even rights under the law, may be con-
sistent with the charge that "might makes right." I have suggest-
ed that corporate power is a determining influence on the assign-
ment of rights in the realm of personal information. Differences
in power, which may shift from time to time between organiza-
tions within the market, or between industry and organized con-
sumer interests, may explain differences in the extent to which
rights are protected by different statutes and regulations.
Because of the nature of relationships between individuals
and corporations, there is likely to be a substantial informational
asymmetry in terms of what one actor "knows" about the oth-
er. 5  First, the corporation will interact with far more individu-
als than any individual is likely to interact with comparable
corporations. Thus, on the basis of direct experience alone, the
asymmetry seems likely. In fact, it is almost assured because of
the absence of coercive resources that individuals might use in
order to force disclosure by corporations. Corporations are most
unwilling to reveal potentially damaging information about them-
selves, even for what is presented to them as scholarly re-
search.5 ' It is unlikely that such concern on the part of busi-
ness could be explained in terms of anxiety about threats to its
competitive position, as it might be with regard to proprietary
information about technical processes or trade secrets. The con-
cern seems instead to be about the negative consequences that
would flow from public disclosure of the kinds of practices that
are common within an industry.5 '
The individual's right to informational privacy is generally
subordinated in deference to the interests of corporations for
" Bailey Kuklin, The Asymmetrical Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Market-
place, 44 U Miami L Rev 893, 936-60 (1990).
12 See discussion of problems in gathering information from corporations in Smith, Manag-
ing Privacy at 51-54 (cited in note 8b).
" In my own research on corporate information practices, I wrote to companies who
had announced products that had privacy implications. I indicated my interest in market-
ing technology, specifically the use of customer information. The response was varied, in
terms of the information they provided. Only 25 percent responded at all. I used a system-
atic sample of American Businesses identified in Dun's Market Identifiers. Out of the 859
establishments I asked to complete a two page questionnaire, only 181 were at all respon-
sive, and only 139 met minimal data requirements. Similarly, Jeff Smith characterized his
research as "a study that almost wasn't" because of the large number of refusals from
firms. Smith, Managing Privacy at 51 (cited in note 85). The primary response from these
finms indicated that the policy relevance of the topic was too sensitive for their organi-
zations to participate. Details of the study conducted by Gandy are found in Oscar H.
Gandy, Jr., The Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information at 108-22
(Westview Press, 1993) (cited in note 144).
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several reasons. The most important reason is because the "bal-
ancing" of interests that courts and legislatures are understood to
pursue makes use of an ideologically distorted scale that gives
the "benefit of the doubt" to corporate interests.15 Indeed, in
the few instances where an idealized "public interest" is seen to
weigh explicitly in this balance, the interest of the firm is more
readily identified with the social collective than are the narrow
selfish interests of the individual.155 A recent review concludes,
after noting that "most states recognize a tort cause of action for
invasion of privacy in some form, . . . [that] they do not receive
them favorably. Indeed, a review of court decisions involving
privacy claims raises doubts as to whether there really is a tort
remedy for invasion of privacy."'56 Indeed, the author continues,
"Review of the case law discloses a judicial wariness-if not out-
right hostility towards-the invasion of privacy torts."'57 A right
of privacy that cannot be exercised is not much of a right, and in
the face of such evidence, belief in the existence of such a right
seems at the very least naive.
C. The Expectation of Privacy
The expectation of privacy is socially constructed and has its
basis in everyday practice, evolving social norms, and, on occa-
sion, within formalized systems that bear the weight of law. This
expectation is based in part upon an awareness of the ways in
which privacy may be threatened, including which actors, with
what kinds of power, may choose among what range of options to
pursue interests involving access to personal information. Some
aspects of this expectation may be assessed by and reflected in
public opinion regarding privacy, and the evidence suggests that
"5 Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law
(University of Chicago Press, 1988). Scheppele suggests that the benefit of the doubt is
readily granted on the basis of relevance. Id at 203. She cites Tureen v Equifax, 571 F2d
411 (8th Cir 1978), as a good example because the organization needed information in
order to make a decision regarding credit and to detect fraudulent claims. All that is
required is for the "information to be legitimately related to a legitimate purpose of the
decision maker." Scheppele, Legal Secrets at 228. This seems a particularly easy standard
to meet in her view "whenever relevance appears as the standard of judgment, all the
defendant has to do is give some plausible reason why the information is relevant to
something that the dependent is entitled to do." Id.
' Regan, Legislating Privacy at 213-43 (cited in note 3).
"5 Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of
Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 NC L Rev 989, 999 (1995).
' Id at 1004.
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people generally feel that their privacy is at risk and that their
options are narrowing. They are not paranoid.
Despite the volumes that have been written about the exis-
tence of a right to privacy, very few areas of personal information
have been defined as off-limits, sensitive, or presumptively confi-
dential. Beyond minimal, but important, restrictions on the col-
lection and use of credit information and videotape rentals, and
cable-television viewing, the generalized sense is that all bets are
off. This includes "medical records, telephone calls, electronic
mail, bank files or criminal histories."158
The region within which individuals have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy has been narrowed by courts.159 Courts
tend to rule that if an individual has, or should have, knowledge
that surveillance and capture of personal information are possi-
ble, and yet they continue to interact with those systems or make
use of those services, then they have demonstrated tacit consent
to be sensed, observed, or measured, and therefore have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.5 0 While the narrowing of the
scope of reasonableness in the context of the Fourth Amendment
is quite clear with regard to government searches, it also seems
clear that this narrowing is occurring with regard to private em-
ployers. 6' David King argues that "court decisions premised on
unreasonable expectations of privacy have functionally conceded
privacy rights on a broad scale to employers and their inter-
est .... Employers will almost certainly subjugate any privacy
right that diminishes legitimate interests, even though employees
may have legally enjoyed the same rights at a different point in
the employment relationship."'62 In citing the case of Baggs v
Jeffrey Rothfeder, Nothing Personal, Netguide 61 (July 1995).
See Laurence A. Benner, Diminishing Expectations of Privacy in the Rhenquist
Court, 22 John Marshall L Rev 825 (1989).
66 See, generally, James J. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an
Expanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 Hastings L J 645, 651-61
(1985); Benner, 22 John Marshall L Rev at 852-73 (cited in note 59); C. Dennis Southard
IV, Individual Privacy and Governmental Efficiency: Technology's Effect on the
Government's Ability to Gather, Store, and Distribute Information, 9 Computer L J 359,
371-73 (1989); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman"'s Fourth Amendment: Privacy or Mutual
Trust between Government and Citizen?, 94 Colum L Rev 1751, 1756-63 (1994).
"6' With regard to communications, Frank Tuerkheimer argues, "Certainly if the
'reasonable expectation' standard is the legal basis for private privacy protection, an
employer, by notice, can effectively remove such expectation from an employee by simply
stating that all information placed on a company computer is the property of the employ-
er, a practice that has been followed." Frank M. Tuerkheimer, The Underpinnings of
Privacy Protection; History of Privacy Protection Issues, 36 Communications of the ACM
69, 73 (Aug 1993).
162 David Neil King, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector Workplace: Protections from
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Eagle-Picher, Industries, Inc.,163 King suggests that the court
"explicitly stated what other courts have only ruled implicitly: An
employer possesses the practical equivalent of an absolute em-
ployment-related necessity defense when it comes to 'intrusive or
even objectionable' invasions of an employee's privacy."' Even
though Congress failed to pass the Privacy for Consumers and
Workers Act of 1993,165 it seems to me that the primary
protections specified within that act were for employees, rather
than for consumers. 66
There is substantial ignorance about the ways in which indi-
viduals may act, or fail to act, to protect their privacy interests in
an electronic environment. As Jeffrey Reiman suggests, it is
impossible to have an expectation of privacy in the kinds of "pub-
lic" behavior one might engage in because we are unaware of the
ways in which panoptic surveillance makes it possible to view
numerous sites of activity from a single vantage point.1
67
Reiman refers to behaviors which have taken place at different
times and different locations, each providing a different bit of
information about an individual. When combined, these individu-
al bits allow the construction of a behavioral profile. This profile
describes and represents "knowledge" about behaviors, in
probabilistic terms, that never actually took place.'68 Because of
this paradoxical circumstance, it is impossible for an individual
to act to protect such interests by attempting to keep them pri-
vate.
This aspect of profiling makes something of a mockery of the
public policy initiatives that emphasize providing individuals
Electronic Surveillance and the Emerging 'Privacy Gap', 67 S Cal L Rev 441, 460-61 (1994)
(cited in note 119).
"' 957 F2d 268 (6th Cir 1992).
16 King, Privacy Issues at 463 (cited in note 19) (quoting Baggs, 957 F2d at 274).
'" HR 1900, 103d Cong, 1st Sess (1993).
'" An instructive, but ironic, example of this claim is found in the section discussing
privacy protections, "no employer may intentionally collect personal data about an em-
ployee through electronic monitoring if the data are not confined to the employee's work,
unless the employee is a customer of the employer at the time of the electronic monitor-
ing." Id § 9(a)(1).
16" Jeffrey H. Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon: A Philosophical Exploration of the
Risks to Privacy Posed by the Highway Technology of the Future, 11 Santa Clara Comput-
er & High Tech L J 27, 37-38 (1995).
.6. This is even more clearly the case if these behaviors are predictions, or the con-
structions of models or simulations generated in response to some sort of "what if' tinker-
ing with the parameters of the model, rather than in response to some behavior of the
individual. See generally, John Goss, 'We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You
Live" : The Instrumental Rationality of Geodemographic Systems, 71 Econ Geography 171
(1995) (cited in note 34).
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with access to their records so that they can correct the errors
that are bound to occur. As aspects of predictive technology based
on probability, all profiles contain some amount of error, and
prediction is never perfect. These days, fairly sophisticated pre-
dictive models contain hundreds of variables, many of which are
estimates that have been drawn from the reported means of
aggregations, like zip-coded neighborhoods. It seems unlikely
that individuals would be able to contest the accuracy of individ-
ual components of such models, and then prevail in a claim of
discrimination. 
1 69
1. Understanding the risks.
The public simply does not understand the ways in which
profiling results in the narrowing of the options they are present-
ed with.70 In a telephone survey in 1994, 26 percent of the re-
spondents who indicated that they were concerned about an "in-
teractive profiling system" were unable to indicate what it was
about the system that troubled them.' In the same survey, 61
percent of those who were concerned indicated that their con-
cerns were linked to informational privacy."17 In this particular
case, profiling was described as a technology that would be used
.69 The case of Cherry v Amoco Oil Co., 490 F Supp 1026 (ND Ga 1980), illustrates
this point well. The plaintiff, a white woman, applied for a gasoline credit card. She lived
in a predominately black neighborhood in Georgia, and her zip code was one of the com-
ponents used in a rating system used by Amoco. She was denied credit, and she claimed
that she was a victim of discrimination because the scoring system assigned low scores to
her zip code. In fact, Amoco used a system with 38 objective factors. While it was true
that her zip code received the lowest of five possible scores, in rejecting her appeal, the
court held that her test was inadequate because it did not "test the effect of zip code as a
criterion involved but rather tests the effect of the overall 38-criteria grading
scheme. . . ." Id at 1031. It seems that it was, in fact, impossible for the plaintiff to win:
"even if the Court were to take liberal judicial notice of facts not presented to it by coun-
sel, there would nonetheless be insufficient evidence from which to draw a conclusion as
to whether Amoco's use of zip code ratings treats otherwise qualified white applicants and
otherwise qualified black applicants in a significantly different manner." Id at 1032. What
use would greater accuracy serve? Could she argue that the 38-item scheme was inade-
quate and could have been improved if it included two additional, or two other, variables?
Could the petitioner ever make that case? I think not.
'70 The ways that organizations of business and government use personal information,
including that derived from transactions, to assign people to categories that determine the
opportunities that are denied to them are components of the operational definition of the
panoptic sort. This construct is outlined in some detail in Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., The
Panoptic Sort: A Political Economy of Personal Information at 53-94 (Westview Press,
1993) (cited in note 144).
"7' Louis Harris & Assoc, Inc, Interactive Services, Consumers and Privacy Study
943007 8 (New York, 1994).
172 Id.
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to determine which advertising messages they would receive
while they made use of an interactive programming service.
173
Survey respondents are rarely if ever provided with a expla-
nation of profiling that emphasizes that they might be denied
access to some goods or services on the basis of information about
their viewing habits. Even so, there is sufficient evidence within
the context of this narrow framing of the problem to suggest that
the general public believes that even the affirmative use of their
personal information for marketing purposes is troublesome.
Some 69 percent of the public agreed that it was a "bad thing"
that information about consumer characteristics, "such as your
income level, residential area, and credit card use" could be used
to "offer goods and services to you."74 Only 4 percent of the
public suggested that they were not at all concerned about the
selling of lists of consumer practices.'75 What do the rest fear?
2. The loss of autonomy.
This strongly felt, but poorly articulated, fear about the risks
of surveillance is hidden below the surface of the popular dis-
course about privacy but is revealed in the analysis of some pri-
vacy scholars. Jeffrey Reiman identifies four classes of risks that
frame privacy in terms of things we value that are lost as privacy
is threatened. 7 ' Many of these are clearly identified with
threats to fundamental liberties.
First, he suggests that people may be limited in their free-
dom to engage in legal activities that are merely unpopular or
unconventional because of the social pressures, including ostra-
cism, that others might apply if they were to learn about these
activities. Hence, there is an interest in keeping this information
private. Privacy "'functions to promote liberty of action'. . . [and]
[i]t applies equally to unpopular political actions which have
nothing immoral or illegal about them."'77
' Id. The question given to the survey participants was set up as follows: "In order to
keep the price of home interactive services reasonable, companies operating these services
[sic] may make use of something called subscriber profiling. This involves collecting
information about your viewing and purchasing patterns. This information is then used by
companies to present advertising and information about products and services that match
your particular interests."
"' The Equifax Report on Consumers in the Information Age 69 (Atlanta GA: Equifax
Inc., 1990)
175 Id.
"' Reiman, Driving to the Panopticon, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at
34 (cited in note 167).
117 Id at 35 (quoting Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law in Ferdinand
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Second, and more directly, Reiman suggests that actions
taken under the awareness of being watched are quite different
from those same actions when pursued in private.'78 Making
love in public seems to be possible for only a very small number
of people. Because we think of showering, and many other nor-
mal bodily functions, as "private," we hesitate to perform them in
public, or while under surveillance. The argument, like the one
that Simitis 79 and others make, is that as more and more ac-
tivities generate records, and as people become more aware that
such surveillance is occurring, people will act spontaneously less
and less. Spontaneous action is autonomous action because it is
not under the control or influence of others. Surveillance threat-
ens spontaneity. In addition, from Reiman's perspective, "[w]hen
you know you are being observed, you naturally identify with the
outside observer's viewpoint, and add that alongside your own
viewpoint on your action. This double vision makes your act dif-
ferent, whether the act is making love or taking a drive."8 '
Surveillance thus results in the loss or denial of options whose
exercise requires, by virtue of cultural conditioning, privacy or
anonymity.
Third, Reiman suggests that invasions of privacy are insults,
even where there is no identifiable harm; indeed, even if the
subject is unaware that they have been observed, or sensed. 8'
This harm is inherent in the denial of dignity. This is the theft of
dignity that the Peeping Tom commits. The consequence is an
insult rather than a palpable injury. Reiman also provides an
important insight into the privacy interests that reach beyond
the individual harms that come from the surveillance of a partic-
ular individual. Again, his view is like that of Simitis, 8 2 in that
it suggests that there is a loss to society that occurs when people
mature without the kind of moral ownership of themselves that
development with dignity provides.
Reiman attaches this social loss to conceptions of maturity
and social development. "The deprivation of privacy stunts matu-
rity, keeps people suspended in a childish state."' Public ob-
Schoeman, ed, Philosophical Dimensions of Privacy 349-50 (1984)).
'78 Reiman, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 37 (cited in note 167).
179 Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U Pa L Rev 707,
732 (1987) (cited in note 5).
'80 Reiman, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 38 (cited in note 167).
"I Id at 39.
182 Simitis, 135 U Pa L Rev at 707 (cited in note 3).
" Reiman, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 40 (cited in note 167).
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servation necessarily is experienced in part as public review, and
to be under constant review serves to reinforce conformity to
what is understood to be acceptable. This is the operational defi-
nition of "correct training."'"' It results in the elimination of the
unconventional, the creative, the exploratory, and the inventive
risk taking that is the source of great value in a dynamic social
system. According to Reiman, people's "inner lives will be impov-
erished to the extent that their outer lives are subject to observa-
tion." 
85
Finally, Reiman suggests that there is even more at risk-in
a sense, a kind of deskilling that occurs-a loss of the internal
basis of self-control. 8 ' The more control is externalized, the less
effort is made by the individual toward developing internal con-
trols. Isn't self-control what we seek for ourselves and value in
others? Paradoxically, then, increased surveillance makes it more
and more likely that our citizens will develop less and less self-
control. As a result, our presumed need for more state-sanc-
tioned, publicly financed, objectively coercive controls (including
the ultimate sanction) seems likely to grow.
D. The Privacy Tort
In addition to statutes that focus primarily on constraining a
powerful government, the right to privacy has also evolved in the
United States through common law tort litigation between pri-
vate parties. While recognition of an intellectual debt to the
scholarly arguments of Warren and Brandeis in 1890 is substan-
tial, ' 7 the formulations provided by the Restatement (Second)
of Torts (§ 652A) in 1977 that incorporated the perspective of
Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 170-94 (Alan
Sheridan trans, Vintage Books, 1979).
" Reiman, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 41 (cited in note 167); See
also C. Edwin Baker, Posner's Privacy Mystery and the Failure of Economic Analysis of
Law, 12 Ga L Rev 475, 479 (1978) (cited in note 21).
"' Reiman, 11 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech L J at 40 (cited in note 167).
I17 Warren and Brandeis are considered the founders of privacy tort law based on
their article The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv L Rev 193 (1890). See also Irwin R. Kramer,
The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 Cath U L Rev 703
(1990); Robert C. Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis: Privacy, Property, and Appropria-
tion, 41 Case W Res L Rev 647 (1991).
126 THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LEGAL FORUM [1996:
William Prosser" have generally resulted in a tort without
substance.
The Restatement limited cognizable claims to four kinds of
invasions of privacy: a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclu-
sion of another; b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness;
c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life; or d)
publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light be-
fore the public.'89 Of those four, only misappropriation has been
pursued with any force. 90 In the view of Robert Post, the col-
lapse of an interest in personality to a far more narrowly defined
interest in property and exploitative rights is a misapprehension
of Warren and Brandeis's original intent."'
Contemporary efforts to operationally define and institution-
alize the commercial property aspects of the privacy interest 92
show very little promise for reversing the trend toward the col-
lapse of our reasonable expectations for privacy. While the cre-
ation of a market in personal information might help establish
some justification for informed consent for the use of personal
information, it would not address the quite substantial problems
of inequality that would distort such a market. While many well-
articulated critiques address the shortcomings of the idealized
markets of economic theory,'93 there are more serious problems
"s William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal L Rev 383 (1960). The influence has been sug-
gested to have been quite substantial. In the view of Andrew Jay McClurg, "for all practi-
cal purposes, there is no separate identity between Prosser's observations concerning the
tort of intrusion in his law review article and the text of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts pertaining to intrusion." Andrew Jay McClurg, Bringing Privacy Law Out of the
Closet: A Tort Theory of Liability for Intrusions in Public Places, 73 NC L Rev 988, 998 n
40 (cited in note 156). Jonathan P. Graham suggests that "Dean Prosser's explication of
privacy invasions as falling into four distinct categories has exercised virtual hegemony
over privacy law." Note, Privacy, Computers, and the Commercial Dissemination of Per-
sonal Information, 65 Tex L Rev 1395, 1417 (1987).
"" Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1976).
190 See generally, the discussion of "the shrinking right of privacy in tort law" in
McClurg, 73 NC L Rev at 996-1009 (cited in note 156). Some commentators have even
argued for expanding the definition of the tort of appropriation so that it might cover
consumer profiles as property. See, for example, Note, 65 Tex L Rev at 1427 (cited in note
188).
,91 Post, Rereading Warren and Brandeis, 41 Case W Res L Rev at 674 (cited in note
187).
192 See Kenneth C. Laudon, Markets and Privacy, Amelia Island Conference Paper,
Civilizing Cyberspace: Priority Issues in a National Information Infrastructure (Jan 1993).
In this paper, Laudon describes the unauthorized use of personal information by organiza-
tions as a major threat to individual privacy, and he suggests a solution might lie with
the establishment of a "National Information Market" with "National Information Ac-
counts."
193 See, for example, Randall Bartlett, Economics and Power: An Inquiry into Human
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to be addressed in understanding and coordinating markets in
personal information.'9 These problems are based in part upon
the peculiar characteristics of information as a resource 95 and
as a commodity'96 that make it different from traditional
goods, 9 7 and make market coordination, the reduction of trans-
action costs, the internalization of substantial external effects,
and the suppression of the tendency toward opportunistic behav-
ior exceedingly difficult to achieve.'98 The fundamental asym-
metry between individuals and bureaucratic organizations all but
guarantees the failure of the market for personal informa-
tion."'99 As Kuklin suggests, the failure of this market will raise
fundamental moral issues as this market's inefficiency "is sys-
tematically beneficial to the merchant" °0 and reflects strategic
intervention by the merchant to take advantage of the limitations
on consumers' (and I would add, employees' and citizens') ability
to make rational choices.2'
Relations and Markets 3-13 (Cambridge University Press, 1989) (cited in note 12); Brian
Burkitt, Radical Political Economy: An Introduction to the Alternative Economics 139-46
(New York University Press, 1984); Daniel M. Hausman, The Inexact and Separate
Science of Economics 205-26 (Cambridge University Press, 1992); Bailey Kuklin, The Gaps
between the Fingers pf the Invisible Hand, 58 Brooklyn L Rev 835 (1992) (cited in note 18);
Donald McCloskey, If You're So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise (University of
Chicago Press, 1990); Uskali Mlki, Bo Gustafsson, and Christian Knudsen, eds, Rationali-
ty, Institutions and Economic Methodology (Routledge, 1993).
14 Kim Lane Scheppele focuses explicitly on the outcomes that might be expected if
rules governing secrets were based on concerns with efficiency, as compared with concerns
for fairness or equality. See generally, Scheppele, Legal Secrets at 24-42 (cited in note
154).
19 Dan Schiller, How to Think About Information, in Vincent Mosco and Janet Wasko,
eds, The Political Economy of Information 27, 31-32 (University of Wisconsin Press, 1988).
1" See, generally, Roger G. Noll, The Economics of Information: A User's Guide, in
The Knowledge Economy: The Nature of Information in the 21st Century 25 (Institute for
Information Studies, 1993).
" Benjamin Bates, Information as an Economic Good: Sources of Individual and
Social Value, in Mosco & Wasko, eds, The Political Economy of Information at 76.
19 See generally, Kuklin, 58 Brooklyn L Rev at 835 (cited in note 18); Michael
Dietrich, Transaction Cost Economics and Beyond: Towards a New Economics of the Firm
(Routledge, 1994).
19 Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Toward a Political Economy of Personal Information, 10
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 70 (1993) (cited in note 6).
"' Kuklin, 44 U Miami L Rev at 1004 (cited in note 151).
20 Id at 1005.
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IV. WHAT IS THERE TO BE DONE?
A. Informed Consent
In the absence of a well-disciplined market that constrains
the influence of unequal power and resources, a statutory re-
quirement of fully informed, affirmative consent should be the
basis upon which privacy interests are preserved for individuals.
An alternative approach to informed consent, one that favors the
individual, is one that assumes that all information is private
and confidential unless the individual indicates otherwise.
This approach is opposed by business and industry and has
been defeated consistently in legislative battles, including those
that some privacy advocates believe they have won.0 2 Business
representatives have argued successfully that the markets for
personal information would dry up, and the direct marketing
sector that depends on such information, would be destroyed."'
Consent should be evaluated in the context of the alterna-
tives available. By this I mean that consent is not actually freely
granted if no meaningful alternatives exist. Consumers are gen-
erally identified as price and contract takers.2' They have little
opportunity to set or to negotiate the terms of the contracts
through which they may "grant" consent. Supporters of a market
in personal information frequently suggest that consent might be
exchanged for a price discount. Eventually, such a market is
likely to reflect the discriminatory interests of some advertisers
who place little or no value on the information they might gather
about individuals who are exploring the Web from a "freenet" or
library terminal. However, this lack of interest should not justify
their denying such a user the opportunity to "pay" the higher fee,
just because their informational value is not worth the "standard
discount."
What are the options facing individuals who do not want to
trade personal information for access to networked resources?
There are examples of individuals who have been denied service
in stores because they refused to provide the marketing informa-
2I2 I refer here to the Video Privacy Protection Act, 18 USC §§ 2710-2711 (1988),
which established a limit on the disclosure of specific information, 18 USC § 2710(b)(1), at
the same time that it established "opt-out" as the normative policy. 18 USC
§ 2710(bX2XB).
" Robert J. Posch, Jr., See Keep Privacy Laws Out of Cyberspace, Direct Marketing
52 (Mar 1995).
Meheroo Jussawalla and Chee-Wah Cheah, The Calculus of International Commu-
nications 75-102 (Libraries Unlimited, 1987).
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tion that management had requested."' Should this option al-
ways be a "take it or leave it" choice?
I believe that we can expect considerable resistance to con-
sumer demands for anonymity, especially in the context of adver-
tiser-supported information services, where information about the
"kinds" of consumer is thought to be vitally important. The pro-
tection of individual interests in aggregate information will be
even more difficult to achieve.
B. Aggregate Information
Because privacy legislation traditionally focuses on individu-
al or personal information, an exception is generally made for
aggregate information.0 6 This is an exception I would like to
challenge.
The recent FCC ruling on Caller ID services prohibits Caller
ID subscribers from using caller information in certain ways in
order to protect the privacy of callers. One exception to these
restrictions allows subscribers to use caller information for "com-
piling, using and disclosing aggregate information."" 7 Aggregate
information is defined as "collective data that relate to a group or
category of services or customers, from which individual customer
identities or characteristics have been removed."0 8 This defini-
tion of aggregate information ignores the fact that the purpose
behind the collection of personal information is to develop strate-
gically useful categories-categories that form the basis for dis-
Robert Gellman recently shared his own similar experience in a post to Computer
Privacy Digest. A clerk at Sears requested his phone number. He refused. The clerk
entered a false number, 555-1212. The clerk then requested his address. This too,
Gellman refused. Even though he was paying with a non-Sears credit card, the salesman
would not sell Gellman the appliance. Another retailer asked for the same information
but was willing to sell the appliance even though Gellman refused to supply the requested
information. Robert Gellman, Information Collection at Sears, 7 Computer Privacy Digest
#7 (available online at gopher://miller.cs.uwm.edu:70/ll/computer%20privacy%2Odigestt
volume7/v7%23008) (July 29, 1995).
206 In discussing the exception for aggregate information in what became the Cable
Communications Act, the Senate argued that "[i]t is not intended to cover the electronic
collection process used to produce aggregate records that are not individually identifiable.
Such aggregate records indicate how groups of subscribers--such as males or residents of
a certain neighborhood-use the system, and therefore pose no perceivable privacy threat
to individuals." Of course, this view denies the existence of group or collective interests.
Cable Telecommunications Act of 1983, S Rep No 98-67, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 28 (1983).
207 Federal Communications Commission, Calling Number Identification Ser-
vice-Caller ID, 60 Fed Reg 29489, 29491 (1995) (amending 47 CFR § 64.1607(a)(3)(iii))
(emphasis added).
20 Id at 29490 (amending 47 CFR § 641600(a)).
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crimination. The management of relations between individuals
and corporations is based on the treatment of individuals as
members of these constructed classes, rather than as unique and
autonomous individuals. Indeed, as one observer notes, "[a]t
present marketers can treat people in geographic groups on an
economic basis provided they treat each individual in such group
similarly. Rejection based on the performance of the group in the
area, rather than individual performance, is permitted within the
bounds of the qualifications set forth ....
The tortured history of anti-discrimination law in the United
States has emphasized the importance of a small set of "protected
groups" or "suspect classifications."212 The underlying rationale
for constructing such classes-a shared history of mistreatment,
such as the experience of slavery, persecution, and the denial of
fundamental rights-has been shaken by the continuing assault
of a vocal opposition. 11 This opposition has used the core as-
sumptions of the neoclassical economic model as the primary
arguments against not only affirmative action, but anti-discrim-
ination laws as well. The theory suggests that, all other things
being equal, irrational personal preferences, such as discrimina-
tion, cannot withstand the press of competition, because freely
accessible information would guarantee that competitive forces
punish such inefficient discrimination.2  Opponents of this
view have argued (convincingly to my way of thinking) that the
market has not operated as the theory suggests, in part because
the market has never existed in the idealized form that might
produce the desired corrective results.23 As a result, objection-
Robert J. Posch, Jr., The Complete Guide to Marketing and the Law 765 (Prentice-
Hall, 1988).
210 The first groups so identified and offered protection were the former slaves and
their descendents, African-Americans. Later, women, other hyphenated ethnic Americans,
and the foreign born were offered similar protections. More recently, and with increasing
controversy, groups forming protected classes have been identified on the basis of age,
sexual orientation, and handicapping condition.
21, Neoclassical economists have argued that racial discrimination in the labor market
represents an irrational personal preference that would, under optimal conditions, be
punished by the marketplace and would therefore be extinguished as an effective social
force. Based on the modern legal theory that marries economic theory with jurisprudence,
Richard Epstein has argued that there ought not be any restrictions on private discrimi-
nation in employment. See Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against
Employment Discrimination Laws (Harvard University Press, 1992); Richard A. Epstein,
Standing Firm, on Forbidden Grounds, 31 San Diego L Rev 1 (1994) (cited in note 17).
212 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Justice (Harvard University
Press, 1981); more generally with regard to discrimination, see Gary S. Becker, The Eco-
nomics of Discrimination 39-54 (University of Chicago Press, 2d ed 1971).
213 In the area of insurance, see Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Contro-
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able discrimination continues, and, in some respects, has expand-
ed.
Racial stereotypes are examples of efforts to assign estima-
tions of group characteristics or attributes to individuals. The
development and elaboration of racial stereotypes has much in
common with other forms of classification. One group (or organi-
zation) develops the classificatory scheme and applies it to oth-
ers-generally others that occupy a subordinate position. Classifi-
cations form the basis for differentiation and comparison and the
benefit of the doubt always tends to favor the dominant group.
Understandably, political opposition to stereotyping is often
based in the claim that such stereotypes are usually a set of
negative attributes that define the members of one group as
inferior to those with whom they are compared. The acrimonious
debate occasioned by the publication of The Bell Curve by Rich-
ard Herrnstein and Charles Murray" 4 underscores this point
while raising serious questions about the reliability of estimates
of a broad range of population parameters.
Where group membership is relatively easy to ascribe, and
where the links between group membership and the distribution
of benefits and satisfactions we associate with life chances are
strong,"' we should not be surprised to see that members of
such groups often act in ways designed to improve the compara-
tive status of their own group. The maintenance of dominant
status for certain groups would suggest that the investments
have been rational and efficient. Along these lines, Richard
McAdams suggests that the promotion of negative racial stereo-
types as applied to members of competing groups is objectively
versy, 131 U Pa L Rev 517 (1983) (cited in note 16); Leah Wortham, Insurance Classifica-
tion: Too Important to be Left to the Actuaries, 19 J L Reform 349 (1986) (cited in note 17).
With regard to continuing racial inequality, see Michael Reich, Racial Inequality: A
Political-Economic Analysis (Princeton University Press, 1981). Regarding employment
discrimination, focusing primarily on race, see David A. Strauss's symposium article, The
Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical
Standards, 79 Georgetown L J 1619 (1991). In the area of discrimination and gender, in
an approach that moves toward the general concern with equality, see Maureen B.
Cavanaugh, Towards a New Equal Protection: Two Kinds of Equality, 12 L & Inequality
381 (1994).
214 The Bell Curve (Free Press, 1994), discussed extensively in a broad range of critical
comments in a compilation edited by Russell Jacovy and Naomi Glaubermann, The Bell
Curve Debate: History, Documents, Opinions (Times Books, 1995).
"' Ralf Dahrendorff defines life chances in terms of the "opportunities for individual
development.., provided by social conditions." Life Chances 30 (University of Chicago
Press, 1979). The "chances" that individuals face are socially constructed, which then de-
fines social structures as "arrangements of chances." Id at 67.
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rational to the extent that such assessments of status influences
the allocative decisions by those with the power to act.216
Institutionalized racism thus exemplifies the use of strategi-
cally constructed impressions of racial groups to reinforce group
status and privilege. This process operates to reward, rather than
to punish, invidious distinctions. 217 However, because of broadly
ascribed moral opposition to racial discrimination, a pragmatic
ideology evolves to provide nonracial justifications for choices
that are fundamentally racially based.
But what is the nature of the group interests that operate
when invidious distinctions are made on the basis of other shared
attributes of groups? They are precisely the same.218 While a
variety of social influences may operate to weaken the connection
between objective social conditions and the development of group
or class consciousness, 219 powerful forms of group identification
can be readily established.22 Individuals who recognize the
benefits that may be derived from identifying with a particular
group (however defined), participate in reinforcing the advantag-
es that such a class enjoys by their articulation of an ideology of
difference that devalues those outside the class. 22' This ideology
2 See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group
Status Production and Race Discrimination, 108 Harv L Rev 1005, 1063-1074 (1995).
21 Robert Cooter argues that "[iln general, sustaining discriminatory norms requires
the collusion of many people, which presupposes sanctions to enforce the discriminatory
norms. Informal sanctions such as gossip, ostracism, and boycotts can operate spontane-
ously, especially when a culture stresses group solidarity." Robert Cooter, Market Affirma-
tive Action, 31 San Diego L Rev 133, 153-54 (1994) (cited in note 19).
218 In interpreting the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 USC §§ 1691-1691f (1994),
the courts accept as evidence of a legitimate business purpose the demonstration of statis-
tically significant discriminability. Posch notes that "The ECOA states that a statistically
sound system must separate creditworthy from noncreditworthy applicants at a statisti-
cally significant rate." Posch, The Complete Guide to Marketing and the Law, at 766-67
(cited in note 209). This means that the coefficient for one of a large number of variables
in the predictive model must be statistically significant.
219 Arthur Stinchcombe discusses the barriers to the development of authentic work-
ing class consciousness that have emerged in the context of a service economy in chapter
8 of his more comprehensive work, Information and Organizations 274-311 (University of
California Press, 1990). Related discussions about contradictory class positions are provid-
ed by Erik Olin Wright, ed, The Debate on Classes (Verso, 1989).
220 McAdams, 108 Harv L Rev at 1005 (cited in note 214), cites numerous examples
from experiments that demonstrate that group identity is quite readily established. Citing
results from one study, McAdams notes that "whenever subjects were divided into groups,
people consistently evaluated members of their own group more favorably than members
of other groups." Id at 1014.
" This is the process by which novel classifications are normalized and institutional-
ized with the active consent of individuals who adopt classifications provided by a variety
of institutions. See, generally, Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think (Syracuse Uni-
versity Press, 1986).
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of difference provides a ready rationalization for discriminatory
decisions in employment, in marketing, and in political communi-
cation, that cannot be easily shown to have been made on the
basis of meaningful efficiency criteria.222
However, even if an individual firm can demonstrate that
the choices it has made on the basis of the intelligence derived
from a predictive model have increased sales, or reduced costs
(granting that ceteris paribus never obtains), we are still likely to
find that objectionable social consequences result from their ac-
tions.22
The privacy interests of individuals are inextricably linked to
the consequences that befall members of the groups or classes to
which they are assigned,224 whether that assignment has been
made by the forces of nature or by a flood of decisions informed
by the solution of a system of equations in some multivariate
statistical model designed to identify groups or "clusters" of per-
sons.
225
It is, of course, quite difficult for us to determine at which
point the specification of the boundaries of an aggregation would
be sufficiently linked to individual identity to raise privacy con-
cerns under the dominant legal construction of "individually
' I want to be clear here to underscore my opposition to the careless, tautological as-
sessments of efficiency that are so common in contemporary talk about markets. I oppose
and reject the bald circularity of arguments that define the status quo as efficient because
"rational" actors are presumed to have "chosen" it. See Walter Adams and James W.
Brock, Economic Theory: Rhetoric, Reality, Rationalization, in Robert E. Babe, ed, Infor-
mation and Communication in Economics 125-35 (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994)
(cited in note 20).
"2 This is a claim rooted in an egalitarian stance that is increasingly unpopular.
Sydney Verba and Gary R. Orren, Equality in America: The View from the Top (Harvard
University Press, 1985); Christopher Jencks, What Must be Equal for Opportunity to be
Equal?, in Norman E. Bowie, ed, Equal Opportunity 47-74 (Westview, 1988). This is also a
perspective that underscores the unwillingness of individuals to be comforted by asser-
tions that decisions which may victimize them, actually work out well "on the average."
Kim Scheppele agrees: "Economists who argue that individuals are on average better off
under an efficiency-valuing scheme will generally not be convincing to a particular indi-
vidual on whom the burden falls, particularly if that individual is asked to shoulder a
great deal while those around her have to sacrifice nothing." Kim Lane Scheppele, Legal
Secrets: Equality and Efficiency in the Common Law 309 (University of Chicago Press,
1988) (cited in note 154).
"' Edward Bloustein discusses numerous reasons for' protecting the privacy interests
of individuals that are linked to the personal utility of group or associational membership.
See Edward J. Bloustein, Group Privacy: The Right to Huddle, 8 Rutgers Camden L J
219, 222 (1977).
"' See generally, John Goss, 'We Know Who You Are and We Know Where You Live":
The Instrumental Rationality of Geodemographic Systems, 71 Econ Geography 171 (1995)
(cited in note 34).
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identifiable information." Ruth Gavison usefully discusses the
kind of indirect concern raised when a great deal of information
is known about a group, and then one discovers that a particular
individual is a member of that group. 28
The privacy concerns of individuals that are based on assess-
ments of the social and economic opportunities that are available
to members of the groups to which they have been assigned are
at some point affected by the decisions of legislatures and courts.
And, as I have argued, when their interests are compared with
those of the firm, the individual is likely to lose.
C. General Principles as Public Policy
I have suggested that collapsing our individual and collective
interest in personhood to those aspects of personal information
that can be governed by contracts and the discipline of the mar-
ketplace ignores the quite severe problems that characterize the
market for personal information. Other observers agree."'
It must be recognized that the interests of the corporate
sector, or of any individual corporation, cannot be assumed to be
wholly, or even primarily, coincident with the interests of an
entire society. Thus, while individual interests may conflict with,
and sometimes ought to prevail over, the interests of the social
collective, the "interests" of a corporate entity can never be as-
sumed to be anything other than subordinate to those of society.
Indeed, the rationale for the creation of the corporate form was,
and ought to remain, the realization of a public purpose that the
grant of special privileges would enable. 8
226 Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L J 421, 429-432 (1980).
227 Joel Ridenberg, for example, suggests that the "marketplace does not have a level
playing field and contains destructive internal inconsistencies." Joel L. Reidenberg, Set-
ting Standards for Fair Information Practice in the U.S. Private Sector, 80 Iowa L Rev 497
(1995) (cited in note 37). He suggests that "political weight is greatly skewed in favor of
the collectors and manipulators of personal information." Id at 533. The fact that these
actors participate so actively in the political process is an inherent distortion of that pro-
cess. Reidenberg apparently shares the view that this marketplace is rife with sources of
inefficiency: "high transaction costs, important externalities, and a significant level of im-
perfect information." Id.
See, for example, Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and
the Bill of Rights, 41 Hastings L J 577 (1990). Mayer argues that even though the Consti-
tution does not mention corporations, the "Framers certainly were aware of corporations.
In that era, most corporations were chartered by state legislatures for specific purposes,
including banks, canal companies, railroads, toll bridge companies, and trading compa-
nies." Id at 579 n 8. The association of the corporate form with the public interest is clear
in terms of the "public utility" attributes of most of those granted a charter. See also
Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937 17-35 (Harvard University
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I have argued that corporations have pursued their interests
in personal information almost without hindrance. I have sug-
gested that the courts and the legislatures have tended to privi-
lege corporate interests against those of individuals because an
ideological frame links the corporate interest with the collective
public interest. Yet it is considered untoward and irresponsible to
conclude on a note of defeat and resignation.
I suppose it is possible, even if it is unlikely, that we might
establish anonymity as the default condition for all transactions
in cyberspace.229 As with Caller ID, where some jurisdictions
now allow subscribers to establish "blocked" status as their pre-
ferred mode of interacting with the telephone network (and
thereby preserve the calling party's control over the transmission
of identifying information), it should be possible to allow the
same status to be selected by computer users. This would allow
consumers to indicate their interest in privacy and would in-
crease the need for those requiring identification to indicate the
reasons, including likely uses, for requiring any form of personal
identification.
I expect, however, that there will be fierce opposition mount-
ed against efforts to increase the ability of individuals to assert
their rights in this area. Robert Posch argues that the protection
of individual privacy is incompatible with the rapid growth of
cyberspace and the information-intensive industries that support
it.23° He argues that "[tlhose advocating the restriction of aggre-
gate data to satisfy an imagined problem could take us out of the
leadership of the 21st Century economy" because "reducing priva-
cy burdens on the free flow of information is the surest way to
stimulate the information economy." 3' And, he celebrates the
success with which corporate interests have been able to defeat
most other attempts to establish the right of privacy as a restric-
tion on business freedom.232
Press, 1991).
' This is the view frequently espoused by Marc Rotenberg. See, for example, Dorothy
E. Denning and Herbert S. Lin, eds, Rights and Responsibilities of Participants in
Networked Communities 106-07 (National Academy Press, 1994) (cited in note 92).
230 Posch, Direct Marketing at 53 (cited in note 203).
2" Id. Of course, there is considerable debate about whether the information economy
represents genuine growth, or a representation of increased costs of coordination of the
underlying material economy that involves the production and distribution of manufac-
tured goods. See generally Jorge Schement and Terry Curtis, Tendencies and Tensions of
the Information Age: The Production and Distribution of Information in the United States
(Transaction Publishers, 1995).,
232 Robert J. Posch, Jr., The 25-Year Privacy Debate has an Institutional Memory,
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The best we might expect to see is that the principles under-
lying the notion of fair information practices2 3 might find their
way into law. Those principles might be summarized in this way:
1. Collection principles would operate to limit the collection
of information to that which is genuinely necessary for the pur-
poses for which it is gathered and would dictate that this infor-
mation should be gathered from the individual, rather than from
third parties.
2. Transparency principles assure that individuals are in-
formed about the ways in which information is to be collected
and used by the organization.
3. Access and correction principles assure that individuals
would have access to the information that organizations have
compiled, and that they would be able to correct information that
they believed to be in error.2 34 Related principles would assign
responsibility to the data gatherer to insure that the information
was accurate and protected against unauthorized use.
4. Use principles are among the most important, and there-
fore the most difficult to establish, because they demand that
once gathered, information is not to be used for purposes other
than those for which it was initially collected.
5. Disclosure principles would require that consent be grant-
ed before personal information could be disclosed to third parties.
Direct Marketing 54 (Apr 1996) (cited in note 70).
233 Similar principles have been discussed in many places over the years, and there
may, in fact, be a substantial movement toward their realization in law. See, for example,
David H. Flaherty, Protecting Privacy in Surveillance Societies: The Federal Republic of
Germany, Sweden, France, Canada, and the United States 371-407 (University of North
Carolina Press, 1989) (cited in note 147); Privacy Working Group, Information Policy
Committee, Information Infrastructure Task Force, Privacy and the National Information
Infrastructure: Principles for Providing and Using Personal Information (Final Version
adopted June 6, 1995) (cited in note 143); Charles Firestone and Jorge Schement, eds,
Toward an Information Bill of Rights and Responsibilities (The Aspen Institute, 1995);
Comments of the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse on the 'Inquiry on Privacy Issues Relating
to Private Sector Use of Telecommunications-Related Personal Information' (Center for
Public Law, Mar 30, 1994); Electronic Privacy Information Center, Privacy Guidelines for
the National Information Infrastructure: EPIC Report 94-1. A Review of the Proposed
Principles of the Privacy Working Group, Washington, DC: EPIC (available online at
http'J/cpsr.org/cpsr/privacy/epic/ EPIC report_94-1.txt).
2 There will undoubtedly need to be considerable negotiation about the requirements
on individuals to demonstrate that the information and the impressions it creates are in-
correct. This is, of course, quite difficult if the information in the file is merely raw data.
It will be quite difficult for an individual to demonstrate that a summary assessment is
false. Realization of the values that are inherent in the establishment of this principle
may require that individuals have the opportunity to include their response to the assess-
ment. Clearly there will be dramatic differences among individuals in their ability to
produce a compelling response to this kind of an assessment.
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It is here that concerns about the sensitivity of the information
are thought to play an important role. For less sensitive informa-
tion, there seems to be a willingness to allow implied consent,
where consent is assumed unless the individual "opted out" of the
disclosure. For more sensitive information, express consent would
be required.

